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 CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TRANSPLANTS – 
LEGAL FAMILIES AND THE DIFFUSION OF (CORPORATE) LAW 
by Holger Spamann
∗ 
(forthcoming, BYU Law Review 2009) 
Abstract:  This paper empirically documents the continued importance of the legal 
families for the diffusion of formal legal materials from the core to the periphery in post-
colonial times.  This raises the possibility that substantive differences between countries 
of different families around the world, such as those documented in the legal origins 
literature, continue to be the result of separate diffusion processes rather than of intrinsic 
differences between common and civil law. 
Using the example of corporate and securities law, the paper documents the 
frequent and often exclusive use of legal materials and models from the respective legal 
family’s core countries in treatises and law reform projects in 32 peripheral and semi-
peripheral countries.  The paper also shows that most authors of these treatises and 
projects were trained in the respective core countries.  Data on the activities of national 
legal development and cooperation organizations, trade and investment flows, and 
student migration confirm the close legal family ties and provide some evidence of 
possible channels through which materials may continue to diffuse within their legal 
families after decolonization. 
The diffusion of formal legal materials need not imply that the substantive 
development of law is affected by foreign influences, at least not in ways that induce 
substantive differences between periphery countries of different legal families.  Various 
theories from comparative law, sociology, political science, and economics provide 
reasons, however, why the content of law in the periphery might continue to be 
influenced by core country models of the same legal family, as the evidence of formal 
diffusion suggests they are. 
JEL: K40, N40, O19, P50 
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Introduction 
Contemporary knowledge on comparative legal systems is strangely bifurcated.  On the 
one hand, some of the most sophisticated comparative lawyers assert that there are few if 
any relevant differences between common and civil law today, judging by key 
characteristics of the legal system, such as case law vs. statute law, the systematization of 
the law, or the lasting influence of Roman law, which are the traditional markers of the 
common/civil law distinction.
1  On the other hand, a very influential literature in 
economics – known as the “legal origins literature” – claims that empirically the 
substantive rules in areas of economic policy ranging from investor protection to military 
conscription differ systematically between common and civil law countries.
2 
How can this bifurcation be explained?  One possibility is that one of the two 
views is, in fact, incorrect.  The economists’ correlations between legal families and 
substantive rules and outcomes might be spurious – their measures of law might be 
incorrect conceptually or factually, and the true drivers of any existing differences might 
be other factors that just happen to be correlated with the legal families.
3  O r  t h e  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., James Gordley, Common law und civil law: eine überholte Unterscheidung, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 498 (1993) [“Common law and civil law: an obsolete distinction”]; Hein 
Kötz, Abschied von der Rechtskreislehre?, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 493 (1998) 
[“Farewell to the theory of legal families?”]; Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law:  Taxonomy and Change 
in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997) (difference between Common and Civil law is 
minimal compared to differences between them and the non-Western systems, including Latin America); 
but see, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 52 
(1996) (arguing that there is an epistemological difference between common and civil law systems). 
2 See, e.g., Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Debt Enforcement Around 
the World, 116 J. POL. ECON. 1105 (2008) (finding that debt enforcement proceedings upon default of the 
debtor are more efficient in common law countries than in civil law countries); Casey B. Mulligan & 
Andrei Shleifer, Conscription as Regulation, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 85 (2005) (finding that French civil 
law countries are more likely to use the draft than common law countries).  For a survey of the entire 
literature, see Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences 
of Legal Origin, 46 J.  ECON.  LITERATURE  285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., The Economic 
Consequences].  Some of the early results of the literature have yielded to better data, in particular the 
paper that started the literature (Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998)), see Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights 
Index” Revisited, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming), and the paper covering the area closest to the historical 
common/civil law distinction (Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003)), see Holger Spamann, Legal Origins, Civil Procedure, and the 
Quality of Contract Enforcement, J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. (forthcoming).  
3 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006) 
(arguing that devastations through war were almost perfectly correlated with civil law in the twentieth 
1  
comparative lawyers might have overstated the degree of convergence, perhaps by 
focusing on the wrong aspects of the legal system. 
This paper suggests another possibility that would reconcile the economists’ and 
the comparative lawyers’ views – diffusion of law along legal family lines.  Policy 
solutions developed in the core countries of Western Europe (and North America) may 
spread to the periphery and semi-periphery countries of their respective legal families by 
imitation, economic pressure, or otherwise.
4  This need not happen instantaneously or 
perfectly.  But when the periphery countries do change their law, they may look to their 
legal family’s core countries for guidance, and in so doing partake of some of the 
particularities of those core countries’ regulation.  This would create policy similarities 
within legal families as observed by the economists, even if there are no important 
intrinsic  differences between common and civil law today, as asserted by the 
comparativists.  In other words, this paper provides an explanation for legal differences 
between legal families that does not rely on anything in the “nature” of “the common 
law” and “the civil law,” respectively.  Conversely, the arguments of this paper imply 
that observed differences of positive law between countries of different legal families do 
not by themselves constitute evidence of deeper differences between “the common law” 
and “the civil law.” 
_____________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                                 
century and set in motion a political cycle that explains the phenomena falsely attributed to the civil law in 
the legal origins literature); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The great reversals: the politics of 
financial development in the twentieth century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (arguing that civil law countries 
were as financially developed as civil law countries around 1913 but then declined because of incumbents’ 
opposition to financial development); Jacek Rostowski & Bogdan Stacescu, The Wig and the Pith Helmet – 
the Impact of “Legal School” versus Colonial Institutions on Economic Performance (second version), 
working paper of the Center for Social and Economic Research (Warsaw 2006) (arguing that differences in 
colonial education policies, not legal systems, drive observed economic differences today); Daniel 
Klerman, Paul Mahoney, Holger Spamann & Mark Weinstein, Legal Origin and Economic Growth, 
working paper, University of Southern California (November 2008) (on file with the author) (arguing that 
other elements of colonial policy, not the transmitted legal system, may drive economic differences today). 
4 Some other scholars reserve the term diffusion to processes that do not involve coordination, see Zachary 
Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33 (2005). 
2  
Diffusion of law has been an important topic in comparative law at least since the 
publication of Alan Watson’s seminal book on “Legal Transplants” in 1974.
5  The very 
existence of legal families spanning the globe is due to the diffusion of legal models 
during colonial times.
6  The challenge, however, is to explain similarities within legal 
families – and differences between families – in areas of law that developed after de-
colonization, such as investor protection and employment law.
7  Diffusion can only 
explain this if the legal families continued to be important for diffusion even after 
decolonization.  While this is often implicitly or explicitly assumed
8, other parts of the 
                                                 
5 Alan Watson, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2
nd ed. 1993, 1
st ed. 1974).  
On diffusion of law in colonial times, see Eric Agostini, DROIT COMPARÉ (1988) 244 et seq., and for even 
earlier times P.G. Monateri, Black Gaius – A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the “Western Legal 
Tradition”, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1999). 
6 See, e.g., for the common law countries J.N. Matson, The Common law Abroad:  English and Indigenous 
Laws in the British Commonwealth, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 753 (1993) (noting that English law was 
codified for transplantation to India, and then other colonies); for Latin America Juan Carlos Gonzaléz, 
INFLUENCIA DEL DERECHO  ESPAÑOL EN AMÉRICA  (1992) (describing the role of Spanish law in Latin 
America before and after independence in the 19
th century). 
7 In as far as relevant differences were already in place before de-colonization, the thesis of this paper is 
trivially true – whatever differences existed between England and France and the other colonial powers 
were presumably at least partially imposed on their respective colonies. 
8 See in particular Esin Örücü, A Theoretical Framework for Transfrontier Mobility of Law, in Robert 
Jagtenberg, Erin Örücü and Annie J. de Roo eds., TRANSFRONTIER MOBILITY OF LAW 1, 14-16 (1995) 
(drawing a map of the English Common law and the Continental European Civil law in ever decreasing 
distance from one another, but both influencing their separate peripheries); Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW  § 3 IV (3
rd ed., Tony Weir transl., 1998 [1996]) (recommending that 
comparative research can generally focus on the legal families’ core countries and neglect the rest because 
the other countries follow the models of the core); Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Import and 
Export of Law and Legal Institutions:  International Strategies and National Palace Wars, in David Nelken 
& Johannes Feest eds., ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 241 (2001) (suggesting that “comparative lawyers’ 
division of the world into ‘legal families’ was in part designed to define segmented markets for 
transplantation of innovations and influence”); Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the 
World (Leximetrics II), 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 141-42 (2008) (arguing that the degree of adaptability in 
transplant countries will in part depend on the closeness of ties with the mother country, particularly 
language); and cf.,  e.g., Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law 
(Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (1991) (borrowing possible only if elements are expressed in 
the same doctrine, which differ from family to family); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of 
Legal Transplantation, in Joseph S. Nye ed., GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 260 (2000) 
(legal origin one influence in choice of template to copy); Christian von Bar, Comparative Law of 
Obligations: Methodology and Epistemology, in Mark van Hoecke ed., EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 123, 125 (2004); William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of 
Law, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 203, 205 (2005) and id., Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM 1 (2005) (diffusion within legal families is the standard case). 
3  
literature assume that legal families are irrelevant for diffusion today
9, and nobody has 
undertaken to investigate the issue systematically. 
Part I of this paper undertakes such a systematic investigation.  The paper 
systematically traces visible foreign influence – citations, the involvement of foreign-
trained lawyers, and evidence of outright copying of statutes – in the major corporate law 
treatises and the drafting histories of securities and corporate law statutes of 32 peripheral 
and semi-peripheral countries (9 common law countries, 7 civil law countries, plus 
OHADA) in the second half of the 20
th century.  Other countries are discussed in 
summary terms.  In what follows, and for reasons that will become clear below, the paper 
refers to this as evidence of “formal diffusion.” 
The evidence shows that formal legal materials from the core countries continue 
to circulate surprisingly widely in the periphery even after de-colonization, and that there 
is a clear differentiation by legal families.
10  Contacts are particularly strong within the 
Commonwealth, which civil law materials do not seem to penetrate at all.  Inversely, 
francophone Africa appears to be fully oriented towards French legal materials.  Latin 
America countries exhibit mixed influences, as do countries on the fringes of the 
traditional families, such as East Asia or the post-soviet transition economies, that were 
never colonized by the Western powers. 
                                                 
9 See in particular Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in 
Mathias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmerman (eds.), OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 473-74  
(2006) (“the boundaries of the world’s legal systems are not watertight.  Legal transfers regularly take place 
across those boundaries, irrespective of what comparative lawyers think about legal families and legal 
traditions.”).  Graziadei may implicitly be referring to the exchange of ideas between core countries. 
10 The restriction of this argument to periphery countries is important.  Exchange between the core 
countries often crosses legal family lines, see,  e.g., Mathias Reimann (ed.), THE  RECEPTION OF 
CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD, 1820-1920 (1993) and Jan von Hein, DIE REZEPTION 
US-AMERIKANISCHEN  GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND  [“The reception of US-American 
corporate law in Germany”] (2008); Jonathan E. Levitsky, The Europeanization of the British Legal Style, 
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 347 (1994); Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western 
Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195 (1994) (book review); Eric Agostini, La Circulation des Modèles Juridiques, 
[1990] REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 461 [“The circulation of legal models”]; Duncan Kennedy, 
Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos (eds.), 
THE  NEW  LAW AND ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  19  (2006).  This being said, it is possible – but not 
investigated in this paper – that even within the group of core countries, the exchange is more lively 
between countries of the same legal family.  In any event, as long as differences between core countries 
remain, these will be reflected in the law of periphery countries that copy from them. 
4  
Part II of the paper documents some channels through which diffusion might 
occur.  First, it maps the activities of the main core countries’ legal development and 
cooperation agencies, and shows that they are almost exclusively directed at periphery 
countries of the same legal family (with the exception of US agencies’ activities).   
Second, the paper probes into underlying economic and cultural ties between countries of 
the same legal family with statistical data about the location of trade and investment 
flows and the migration of students. 
Part III reviews theories from comparative law, sociology, political science, and 
economics that can explain why (formal) diffusion happens, and why it is fully or 
partially segregated by legal family.  There is now a vibrant literature in the social 
sciences documenting the importance of diffusion for policy-making in general.
11  The 
drivers of diffusion considered in the literature include mimicking, learning, competition, 
and imposition.  This paper develops reasons why periphery countries might be primarily 
influenced by models of their own legal family.  These include genuinely legal reasons 
such as institutional complementarities or the difficulty to integrate unknown legal 
concepts; ease of access based on linguistic, educational, or professional ties (such as 
those documented in this paper); and being part of the sphere of influence of the core 
country (cf. the differential trade flows documented in Part II).  Consistent with these 
theories, countries for which these reasons are not applicable or strongly attenuated, such 
as Japan, indeed draw from a broader array of models and are outliers in the data of the 
legal origins literature (see Part I.A.2 below). 
The evidence of legal family differences in formal diffusion (Part I), in possible 
channels of diffusion (Part II), and in substantive rules and outcomes (documented in the 
legal origins literature, and assumed to be true for the purposes of the argument), and the 
theory developed in Part III, fit together and form an appealing story.  For various 
historical reasons, economic policy in Anglo-Saxon (common law) core countries is more 
market-oriented than in Continental European (civil law) core countries, as epitomized in 
                                                 
11 See the references cited in Parts III and IV below. 
5  
the expression “Anglo-Saxon capitalism.”
12  By copying from their respective core 
countries, countries of the periphery replicate some part of those differences.  As a result, 
economic policy differs systematically between civil and common law countries even 
though no political or cultural explanation can account for this (outside the core).  This is 
exactly what the legal origins literature finds.
13 
By contrast, theories attempting to explain the empirical differences between civil 
and common law countries outside the core with internal, structural attributes of the legal 
system have not fared well in the data (such theories will be referred to as “structural 
theories” in this paper
14).  In particular, explanations centered on the (beneficial) role of 
case law cannot explain the major differences documented in the data because these 
overwhelmingly derive from statutory law.
15  Explanations based on European 
comparative history by themselves cannot explain the differences in the periphery.
16  
Reflecting the difficulty of formulating a structural theory that can explain the data, the 
leading authors of the legal origins literature now characterize the differences between 
                                                 
12  See  http://en.wikipedia.org/Anglo-Saxon_capitalism (visited 04/11/2009); and for the more general 
argument Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in Peter A. Hall & 
David Soskice (eds.), VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 1 (2001); Gosta Esping-Andersen, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990); 
particularly for corporate law Mark J. Roe, POLITICAL  DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE 
(2003) (arguing that the respective strength of labor and business interest groups determine corporate 
governance arrangements); Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (2005) (arguing that 
corporate governance arrangements are determined by election rules). 
13 See La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences, supra note 2. 
14 Such “structural theories” are sometimes referred to as “internal determinants models” in the political 
science literature, see, e.g., Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Innovation and Diffusion Models in 
Policy Research, in Paul A. Sabatier, THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 169, 170 (1999). 
15 See Roe, supra note 3. 
16 The deepest attempt at historical explanation is Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 
Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002) (tracing differences between common and civil law back to 12
th and 13
th century 
England and France, arguing that the introduction of the English judicial systems with its use of juries 
decentralized litigation, while France somewhat later centralized it).  This interpretation of the historical 
record is questioned by Daniel Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, Legal origin?, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 278 (2007) 
(locating the more important divergence of the two countries’ litigation systems in the mid-17
th to mid-19
th 
century).  Mark J. Roe, Juries and the political economy of legal origin, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 294 (2007) 
points out that the key institution singled out by Glaeser & Shleifer, the jury, is no longer in use in civil 
procedure outside the United States and was not generally transplanted to English colonies, and that in 
general historical events of many centuries ago by themselves cannot explain differences today without an 
argument for extreme path dependency. 
6  
legal families as different “style[s] of social control of economic life (and maybe of other 
aspects of life as well),” where “common law stands for the strategy of social control that 
seeks to support private market outcomes with state-desired allocations.”
17  They offer a 
technological interpretation (civil and common law have different “toolkits”), and a 
cultural interpretation (different “beliefs about how the law should deal with social 
problems … become incorporated in legal rules, institutions, and education”).
18  It is not 
yet clear, however, what exactly these technological constraints could be, or how colonial 
legal transplantation could have transmitted such deep cultural beliefs, or whether this 
indeed occurred.
19  This paper offers a third interpretation that allows for all possible 
drivers of differences within the core, and merely explains how these differences spread 
to the periphery through diffusion (abandoning the attempt to account for patterns in both 
regions with one unitary theory). 
Part IV checks this diffusion theory against some additional empirical facts, and 
considers more formal tests.  At present, the lack of requisite data prevents most formal 
tests of diffusion theories against structural theories.  Moreover, such tests are 
considerably complicated by the fact that in their most general form – i.e., without 
specifying particular mechanisms of diffusion and relevant structural characteristics, 
respectively – diffusion and structural theories have broadly identical predictions.  The 
current legal origins theory being broad as described above, it is hard if not impossible to 
reject it in the data.  Essentially, the problem is that one cannot prove a negative – one 
cannot prove that there is no  possible structural characteristic that could drive the 
observed differences between periphery countries of different legal families.  The most 
one can do is to test those characteristics that appear plausible, and, inversely, to test 
whether the observed pattern is consistent with diffusion.  On these counts, diffusion 
seems to be the better explanation, given the available evidence. 
                                                 
17 See La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences, supra note 2, 286. 
18 Id. at 308. 
19 Cf. Roe, supra note 3 (pointing out that both legal families use the full array of legislative, judicial, and 
administrative tools). 
7  
Before beginning with the detailed analysis, and previewing some of the 
arguments from Part III below, it will be helpful to position the analysis of this paper in 
relation to existing work on diffusion (“legal transplants”) in comparative law.  As theory 
would suggest, this literature finds that diffusion involves complicated interactions of 
domestic and foreign actors
20; that these actors exercise choices about what, when, and 
how to transplant
21; and that transplanted formal law often operates quite differently in 
the recipient country than its counterpart in the origin country.
22  This paper does not 
deny any of this.  The argument of this paper is, however, that it is both theoretically 
plausible and borne out by the available evidence that the choices of domestic actors are 
constrained by the available models, that models of one’s own legal family are more 
available and hence more likely to be adopted than others, and that at least some of the 
differences between core models survive the transplantation to the periphery.  Evidence 
of formal diffusion alone would not be enough to support this.  But the combination of 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas 
from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617 (2007) (documenting the role of a network of Latin American 
lawyers in profound reforms of Latin American criminal procedure that introduced elements of an 
accusatorial system over the last two decades). 
21 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory of Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 785 (1982) 
(book review) (emphasizing the importance of domestic politics for the decision if and when to adopt a 
foreign model).   
22 For examples, see, e.g. Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and 
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, especially 1754-57 (2000) (discussing 
how the Russian corporate law statute that the authors helped design failed to protect minority shareholdes 
in an environment where enforcement was lacking); Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate 
Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV.  527 (2001) 
(describing how Japanese corporate law diverged from its US model between 1950 and 2000).  For 
systematic evidence, see Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic 
development, legality, and the transplant effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003); id., The Transplant Effect, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003) (demonstrating empirically that countries that do not develop law internally, 
do not adapt a transplant, and did not have a population already familiar with basic principles of the 
adopted law tend to have ineffective legal systems); Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp 
& Mark D. West, Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 676 (2003); id., The Evolution of 
Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002) (documenting that 
transplant countries do not change their laws as frequently as origin countries).  That transplanted law often 
does not function as it does in the origin country is hardly surprising if the law is imposed abruptly and 
without preparation, as in the post-soviet transition countries in the 1990s that had neither the time nor the 
expertise to engage in a careful assessment and deliberation of the models being offered, cf. Katharina 
Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 
325, 340 (2000) (commenting that the process of legal adaptation was such that it “hardly gives the law 
receiving countries a chance to read, much less to understand or adapt the legal concepts embodied in the 
new statutes to specific conditions of their countries”). 
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this evidence with that of the legal origins literature is.  Thus, the paper does not argue 
that copying is everything, just that it is more than nothing:  by copying English law, 
Ghana’s legal system will not become the same as the English, but it will become more 
like the English than Senegal’s legal system, which follows French models.  Let us now 
turn to that evidence of copying. 
I.  EVIDENCE OF FORMAL DIFFUSION 
This Part will lay out evidence of formal diffusion.  Since the ultimate goal is to explain 
empirical regularities in samples of over 100 countries (as documented in the legal 
origins literature), the approach of this Part emphasizes breadth over depth.  It 
systematically canvasses statutes and their legislative history as well as leading treatises 
for evidence of visible foreign influence in 9 common law countries, and 7 French civil 
law countries and OHADA (a uniform law organization of francophone African 
countries); it also reports various bits of evidence from other places.   
The evidence presented in this Part is conclusive as far as the existence of formal 
diffusion is concerned.  One cannot but see diffusion in identical statutes, citations to 
foreign materials, and the presence of foreign draftsmen in the legislative process.   
Whether formal diffusion is quantitatively important, and whether it is relevant for 
substantive outcomes, is another question that will be addressed in Part III below. 
The evidence for the role of legal families is necessarily less strong.  The 
statement that legal families matter is either negative (no influence of the other family) or 
relative (less influence).  As a matter of logic, one cannot prove the former.  Similarly, 
conclusions regarding the latter will always be probabilistic and rely on sampling 
assumptions.  For all practical purposes, however, the picture that emerges is persuasive.  
The exchange of legal materials and personnel is much more prevalent within legal 
families than across legal family lines.  In particular, civil law materials and personnel do 
not seem to penetrate the common law periphery at all. 
Subpart  A provides further details about the methodology, and discusses its 
validity.  Subpart B presents the data. 
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A.  Methodological considerations 
To keep the work within manageable bounds, the inquiry focuses on statutes and treatises 
in corporate law in medium to large periphery or semi-periphery countries of the 
Common law and French Civil law families and which maintain a Western European 
language as the (or one) working language of lawyers.  Section I.A.1 spells out the 
implications of these restrictions, i.e., what materials exactly this Part I will look at.  
Section I.A.2 explains why these restrictions do not affect the validity of the analysis.  
Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2 present the actual evidence for Common law and French Civil 
law jurisdictions, respectively. 
1.  Scope of inquiry 
The restriction to countries in the French and Common law families mainly excludes 
mixed jurisdictions (which by definition partake of influences from different families
23), 
the East Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, all of which were originally 
influenced by civil law models but came under US influence after WWII
24), and 
transition countries (i.e., formerly socialist countries such as China, Russia, or Vietnam, 
which are now subject to a mix of influences)
25.  The additional restriction to countries 
                                                 
23 For example, the Philippines were originally influenced by Spanish law but then became a US colony 
and adopted large amounts of US materials; cf.,  e.g., Andrew Harding, Comparative Law and Legal 
Transplantation in South East Asia, in Nelken & Feest, supra note 8, 199, 217 (reporting how Philippine 
casebooks on constitutional law use Philippino and US cases side-by-side). 
24 For example, under the US occupation, Japan completely revised its corporate law along the lines of the 
1933 Illinois Business Corporation Act.  It fits the theme of this paper that the Illinois model was selected 
for no other reason than that the US officials involved in this process happened to be attorneys from 
Illinois.  See Thomas L. Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions Concerning 
Corporations, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 12 (1953) (the reference to the Illinois lawyers is at 15).  Since then, the 
US influence has even increased, in particular with the adoption of the Securities and Exchange Law, see, 
e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and 
the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 3, 15-19 (1996); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, LAW & 
CAPITALISM 93-101 (2008) (reporting that the advent of hostile takeovers in Japan triggered the adoption of 
takeover guidelines along the lines of Delaware jurisprudence, including the poison pill); but see West, 
supra note 22 (arguing that in fact Japanese corporate law has diverged from the US model since 1950).  
US academics were active in Taiwan at the time as well, for example Roscoe Pound, see Roscoe Pound, 
Progress of the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 345 (1948).  As a result, current corporate 
legislation in these two countries and South Korea looks much more similar to US than German statutes 
today. 
25 On the diversity of advisors and models found in the transition countries, see, e.g., Gianmaria Ajani, By 
Chance and Prestige:  Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995); 
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operating their legal system in a Western language mainly concerns the middle east and 
Indonesia; surprisingly, other countries continue to utilize Western languages in legal 
discourse even though it differs from the national language. 
The restriction to countries of the periphery and semi-periphery excludes 
phenomena like diffusion from the United States to Canada, the joint elaboration of a 
Scandinavian company law statute by Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland in the 
1960s and 1970s,
26 or the common germano-phone legal discourse of Austria, Germany, 
and Switzerland,
27 all of which may of course contribute to similarities within legal 
families. 
For statutes, the paper looks for foreign influences in the legislative history as 
documented in official reports, treatises on the subject, or law journals.  Such influences 
                                                                                                                                                 
Esin Örücü, CRITICAL COMPARATIVE LAW 118-128 (1999).  On the US side, USAID and ABA-CEELI 
were the most active participants.  As the title of Ajani’s piece suggests, the choice of model often seems to 
have been the results of mere chance, i.e., which advisor happened to be in the right place at the right time.  
For examples, see Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change:  Shareholder and Creditor Rights in 
Transition Economies, 1 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 59, especially 69-71, 77, 84, and 93 (2000) (on Central 
and Eastern Europe); John Gillespie, Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and Cultural Analysis of 
Market-Entry in Vietnam, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 641 (2002) (on Vietnam); and Jacques deLisle, Lex 
Americana?  United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-
Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L 179 (1999) (on Laos). 
26 See Krister Moberg, Company Law, in Michael Bogdan ed., SWEDISH LAW IN THE NEW MILLENIUM 374, 
378 (2000); cf. Mogens Ebeling & Bernhard Gomard, CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS IN DENMARK 
paras. 15-16 (1993) (the four countries’ drafts of 1969-1971 were almost identical, but Denmark’s EC 
accession in 1973 required some deviations in the Danish approach).  Specifically on the drafting process, 
see Jan Skåre, Det Nordiske Aksjelovsamarbeidet, 101 TIDSSKRIFT FOR RETTSVITENSKAP  606 (1988).   
Subsequently, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden had to adapt to EU directives, and all four statutes have been 
recently more thoroughly revised, but the common imprint is still very visible; see Peter Wahlgren, 
introduction,  45 SCANDINAVIAN LEGAL STUDIES (2003) (special volume on company law).  For example, 
one finds in all four jurisdictions a rather characteristic rule regarding charter provisions for the 
election/nomination of the board (at least half must be elected by majority of shareholders): cf. §§ 49, 77 
Public Company Law (Denmark), Chs. 8:1.2, 9:13.2 Companies Act (Finland), Art. 9-13(3) Public Stock 
Companies Act (Norway), and Art. 8:6 Companies Act (Sweden) (in their current numbering).  On the 
institutional framework for this cooperation in the Nordic Council, see Section II.A below. 
27 German case law and legal writing exerts a particularly strong influence on Austria because Austria 
copied the German public corporations statute (Aktiengesetz) in 1938, and most provisions in the Austrian 
and German statutes are therefore identical.  One of the main German commentaries (written mainly for 
practitioners) on the German share corporation act has parallel commentary by Austrian academics on the 
corresponding Austrian provisions:  Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR 
ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, 9 vols. (2
nd ed. 2000-2006).  Austrian commentaries refer to German sources as a 
routine matter.  The Swiss corporate law statute is less close to the German one, but still the intellectual 
exchange is very strong, with German legal academics often occupying positions in Swiss universities and 
vice versa; Swiss lawyers also publish in German legal periodicals rather frequently. 
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include the involvement of foreign personnel and references to foreign models.  The 
paper also points out various instances of verbatim copying of statutes, the strongest 
possible form of (formal) foreign legal influence.  It does not, however, systematically 
compare statutes of core and periphery countries to ascertain quantitatively the amount of 
lexical overlap.  This would be technologically feasible (even though the required 
software is much more complex than one might expect).  But it would yield rather limited 
information – to prove the existence of literal copying, showing one instance is enough; 
to show the extent or impact of literal copying, even showing that 99% of the words are 
identical would not be enough because even just a 1% element of domestic additions 
might fundamentally alter, even reverse, the content of a copied statute (not to speak of 
the effect of enforcement). 
In treatises, the paper looks for citation patterns: whom do they cite, and if they 
cite foreign sources, how quantitatively important are these compared to domestic and 
other foreign sources?  Where possible, the paper also documents the educational 
background of the authors.  The treatises are interesting for three reasons, besides being 
relatively easily accessible.  First, they are written for (future) practitioners, so that it is 
reasonable to infer that the information contained therein must have practical relevance, 
i.e., that the amount of discussion of foreign law reflects the foreign law’s influences on 
domestic law.  Second, the books reflect the state of mind of the authors, and they or their 
colleagues with similar backgrounds and thinking are the people drafting the legislation 
and deciding the cases.  Last not least, students reared on this information will reproduce 
the orientation to foreign sources in their careers.  (In this sense, the use of foreign 
sources in textbooks not only reflects but also creates the influence of those foreign 
sources.
28) 
By way of background, it is important to contrast the impressions from the 
periphery collected below with the situation in the leading jurisdictions.  The leading US, 
French, and German treatises on corporate law do not contain a single reference to 
                                                 
28 Cf. Alan Watson, The Importance of “Nutshells”, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1994) (reporting the profound 
influence legal textbooks have had on legal development). 
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foreign law.
29  This is particularly remarkable because these are not practitioners’ texts 
but foundational/instructional texts that try to cast the net wide.  It is not surprising then 
that court decisions from these countries also never refer to foreign law, at least in 
corporate law.  The situation is not much different in the UK, although the occasional 
reference to Australian or New Zealand cases can be found there.
30  In the periphery, we 
will see the inverse:  for example, in Kenya the only cases cited are English; in Latin 
America outside Argentina, the majority of the cited literature is foreign. 
2.  Validity of inquiry 
Before delving into the actual evidence, some comments are necessary to reassure the 
reader that the restrictions imposed on the breadth of the inquiry do not “stack the deck” 
in favor of the evidence sought after in this paper. 
The focus on corporate law reflects the interests of the author.  Perhaps diffusion 
is more prevalent in corporate law than elsewhere, but to make the point that formal 
diffusion exists and that legal families seem to matter for it, the area seems as good as 
any.  (The question of the quantitative importance of diffusion is deferred to Parts III and 
IV below.) 
To show the mere existence of diffusion, one might look at any number of 
different places where diffusion might manifest itself.  The two places chosen here – 
statutes and the principal treatises, including practitioners’ commentaries – appear 
particularly central.  This is obvious for statutes and their legislative history.  The 
importance of treatises was already explained above. 
The choice of larger jurisdictions is primarily one of convenience.  Larger 
jurisdictions produce more and better books in which to find the relevant information.  If 
                                                 
29 The texts are Robert C. Clark, CORPORATE LAW (1986); George Ripert & Réné Roblot, TRAITÉ DE DROIT 
COMMERCIAL vol. 1(2) (18
th ed. 2002 by Michel Germain); and Karsten Schmidt, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
(4
th ed. 2002).  Other observers might think that other texts are more important in their respective 
jurisdictions than these three, but it seems safe to assume that consulting any other major treatise from 
these countries would show the same picture regarding foreign materials. 
30 The treatise sampled here is Paul L. Davies, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY 
LAW (7
th ed. 2003); English court decisions occasionally cite decisions from other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions (cf. I.B.1.b) below) and, rarely, from the US. 
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anything, this choice will understate the importance of diffusion because large countries 
are more likely to produce law autonomously, and hence less likely to copy from abroad. 
What may appear problematic is the restriction of the sample to countries within 
the French and English families preserving a Western language – which excludes mainly 
East Asia, mixed jurisdictions, and transition countries.  For the purposes of documenting 
the mere existence of diffusion, the restriction is again irrelevant – any sample will do (as 
long as one finds diffusion anywhere, existence is no longer in question).  But one might 
be concerned that this construction of the sample overplays the importance of the legal 
families by excluding precisely those countries which are presumably subject to 
influences from various legal families. 
The strongest possible criticism is that this paper’s argument is circular as a 
matter of strict logic.  The criticism would assert that countries are classified as member 
of a legal family because they continue to copy (only) from that family’s core country, so 
that diffusion is limited to within legal families by definition.  This argument is a special 
case of an endogeneity problem – while the researcher analyzes the effect of A on B, in 
reality B may have caused A.  More broadly, one might ask if countries that are 
economically different chose legal families accordingly, rather than attributes of legal 
families causing such differences.  For this particular criticism, however, the legal origins 
literature has a good answer.  The vast majority of countries were colonized and could 
not choose their legal family; it was imposed on them by their colonial power.  For those 
countries, legal family membership is exogenous and the argument of this paper is not 
circular.  In fact, to avoid endogeneity problems, careful research should  exclude 
countries that were never colonized, which comprises mainly those of East Asia, 
Thailand, Eastern Europe, and, arguably, those that belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 
World War I.
31  Likewise, countries that were successively colonized by Western powers 
of different legal families – which are mostly jurisdictions now classified as mixed – 
should be excluded because whether they later followed one or the other legal family, or 
a mix of both, is, without further information, endogenous. 
                                                 
31 See Klerman et al., supra note 3. 
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This leaves only a very small number of countries, such as Vietnam, for which the 
decision to exclude them from the analysis might be considered problematic.   
Quantitatively, there are too few such countries to outweigh the results for the countries 
in the sample.  For what it is worth, these and other countries excluded here were never 
considered to be part of the civil or common law family by the comparativists who 
created the legal family classification around the time of de-colonization, i.e., before the 
relevant events analyzed in this paper and therefore, from this paper’s perspective, 
exogenously.
32 
To be sure, the legal origins literature classifies the East Asian and transition 
countries as civil law countries, and mixed jurisdictions mostly as common law 
jurisdictions.  From this perspective, these countries should be included in an analysis of 
legal families’ role in diffusion.  It is not necessary to do so explicitly, however, because 
whatever results one would find in these countries would not reverse the conclusions to 
be drawn from the evidence below.  To see this, assume – as seems indeed to be the 
case
33 – that the East Asian and transition countries (by this count, civil law countries) 
also import formal materials from common law countries, and that mixed jurisdictions 
                                                 
32 The leading comparative law textbook today, Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 8, §§20-21 considers law in 
East Asian countries separate from the common and civil law family under the heading “far-eastern legal 
family.”  It already did so in its first edition, which also separated the socialist countries as a separate legal 
family, see Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, I EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG §§ 23-27 (socialist 
legal family), § 28 (far-eastern law) (1971).  As acknowledged id. at v, the book’s position on the legal 
families was based on an earlier article with the same classification of legal systems separating socialist and 
far eastern systems from common and civil law, namely Konrad Zweigert, Zur Lehre von den 
Rechtskreisen, in Kurt H. Nadelmann, Arthur T. Von Mehren & John N. Hazard (eds.), TWENTIETH 
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW – LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 42, 55 
(1961).  What was to become the other main textbook of the second half of the 20th century, René David, 
LES  GRAND  SYSTÈMES DE DROIT  CONTEMPORAINS (1
st ed. 1964), also thought that the socialist legal 
systems were sufficiently distant from their civil law roots to treat them as a category apart (id. 22), and so 
he dedicated a separate part to socialist legal systems (id. 147-308) at the same level as common and civil 
law.  David also dedicated a subpart to “law of the far east” comprising among others, Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan (id. 519-47) and he notes that inspite of the adoption of codes, these countries have not internalized 
a Western understanding of the law, and explains further in the text that much of the formal law remains 
dead letter (id. 520); still, he does, with reservations, include these countries in the civil law family (id. 19).  
In his earlier work, David distinguished occidental law, soviet law, islamic law, hindu law, and chinese 
law, see René David, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ 224 (1950) (in this classification, 
East Asia and the transition countries would have been outside the “occidental” family comprising civil and 
common law, but on the other hand so would have been the African countries considered in this paper).   
33 See the references cited supra notes 24-25. 
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(by this count, common law countries) also import materials from civil law countries.  
This would certainly complicate the picture and introduce more elements of cross-family 
diffusion.  But it would still be the case that the likelihood that a model will come from 
one core country rather than another differs by legal family.  In particular, it would still 
be the case that civil law materials circulate only in the civil law family (now broadly 
defined to include East Asian and transition countries), with the exception of the few 
mixed jurisdictions.  As repeatedly emphasized, this likelihood differential is all that is 
required for the argument of this paper to work.  It is also worth noting that in most of the 
empirical results of legal origins literature, the East Asian countries resemble common 
law countries, and mixed jurisdictions do not do as well as common law countries, which 
would fit the diffusion pattern assumed in this paragraph.
34 
A weaker criticism is that omitting countries at the fringe of the English and 
French families suppresses evidence of  cross-family diffusion, thereby creating the false 
impression that such cross-family diffusion is rare and, presumably, difficult.  This is first 
and foremost an issue for the interpretation of the evidence and as such will be taken up 
in Part III.B below.  It bears pointing out here, however, that the excluded countries are 
rather different as far as conditions for diffusion are concerned.  The working language of 
lawyers in all of the excluded jurisdictions except the mixed jurisdictions is not a Western 
European one.  Hence in as far as diffusion is tied to legal families by language, these ties 
are not operational for the excluded jurisdictions (for example, they would incur 
translation costs regardless of which model they copy).  Moreover, the excluded 
jurisdictions are much less deeply rooted in either the common or French civil law 
families, so they will find it harder to adapt models from either family, and the 
incremental cost of taking a model from the more remote one will be less.  In particular, 
the East Asian countries never adopted a Western legal system wholesale, and the 
transition countries were detached from their former legal family (the civil law) for 
between 45 and 70 years. 
                                                 
34 Indeed, Japan and South Korea have been classified as common law countries in the most recent legal 
origins literature, see Djankov, Hart et al., supra note 2, at 1120. 
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B.  Data 
1.  The Common law family 
This Section considers evidence of formal diffusion in peripheral and semi-peripheral 
countries of the Common law world.  The countries sampled systematically were Ireland, 
Australia, New Zealand; India, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore; Kenya and Nigeria. 
Perhaps because English has remained the legal language in all Common law 
jurisdictions, even in those with a dominant national language other than English (such as 
Malaysia), formal diffusion between these jurisdictions – more precisely, between 
countries belonging to the Commonwealth, which excludes the US – appears to be 
continuing on a massive scale.  By contrast, there is absolutely no mention of sources 
from outside the Common law world in any of the countries discussed below. 
a)  Treatises 
Law books, court decisions, and legislative draftsmen throughout the Commonwealth 
appear to pay close to developments of statutory and case law in other Commonwealth 
countries.
35 
This is true even in the semi-periphery.  Irish text books, for example, are mostly 
written by authors with English legal training, and Irish decisions make up at most one 
third of the cases cited, most of the remainder being English decisions, with occasional 
citations to Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and US cases.
36  In Australia, the 
                                                 
35 In fact, even the British courts look to other Commonwealth jurisdictions for inspiration, see Esin Örücü, 
Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 205, 219 n.68 (2002).  According to Lord Keith in Martin v. 
Watson, [1995] All E.R. 559, 562-565, such Commonwealth precedents could even be binding for English 
courts if pertinent English precedents were inexistent.  In Australia, English decisions were formally 
considered binding for a long time after independence (1902), see Zelman Cowen, The Binding Effect of 
English Decisions Upon Australian Courts, 60 L.Q. REV. 378 (1944) (considering Australian courts bound 
by decisions of the House of Lords unless the Privy Council rules otherwise); Ross Parsons, English 
Precedents in Australian Courts, 1 ANN. L. REV. 211 (1948-1950) (favoring treating all House of Lords 
decisions as binding).  On the Privy Council, see below note 113. 
36 The texts sampled were Michael Forde, COMPANY  LAW  (3
rd ed. 1999) (Forde has his PhD from 
Cambridge UK, is a barrister at Middle Temple [London], and also published a book on THE LAW OF 
EXTRADITION IN THE UK  (1995)); Ronan Keane, COMPANY  LAW  (3
rd ed. 2000); and Blanaid Clarke, 
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS IN IRELAND  (1999) (Clarke has her PhD from Manchester UK [see 
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standard textbook (2005) is written by two authors with Harvard and one with Oxford 
graduate legal education; and post-independence (1902) English cases make up about 1/6 
of the citations, with occasional references to New Zealand and US cases.
37  The book 
also cites numerous articles from law journals from around the Common law world, in 
particular the US and the UK.
38  Chapter 4 of the standard Australian casebook for 
students (1999) consists almost exclusively of English decisions; of the 3 authors, one has 
a Harvard postgraduate degree, and another one studied only in Canada and the UK in the 
first place.
39  A similar picture emerges in New Zealand.
40  In all three countries, 
citations to statutes are predominantly domestic, but there are also a number of citations 
to UK statutes and occasionally to other developed Commonwealth countries. 
                                                                                                                                                
With respect to cited statutes and training of the authors, a similar pattern emerges 
in the periphery countries.  With respect to cases, however, the foreign influence is even 
more pronounced.  First of all, the vast majority of cases cited in works from around the 
year 2000 are pre-independence English cases.
41  More importantly, even among the 
post-independence cases, foreign cases predominate (Hong Kong [UK], Kenya [UK], 
 
http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=423] and also cites stock exchange rules 
from foreign, English speaking countries: LSE, NASDAQ, EASDAQ, NYSE). 
37 H.A.J. Ford, R.P. Austin & I.M. Ramsay, FORD’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW (12
th ed. 2005). 
38 Cf. the list of journal abbreviations.  The closest would have been the McGill Law Review (published in 
Quebec, but in English and at a mixed university) and the South African Law Review (from a mixed 
jurisdiction). 
39 Robert Baxt, Keith Fletcher & Saul Fridman, AFTERMAN AND BAXT’S  CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS (8
th ed. 1999). 
40 The books sampled were Buddle Findlay, COMPANIES, in THE LAWS OF NEW ZEALAND vol. 6 (2005 
reissue); and Ross B. Grantham & Charles E.F. Rickett, COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW – COMMENTARY 
AND MATERIALS (2002) (collectively, the two authors only hold one law degree from New Zealand, and a 
post-graduate one at that: Grantham’s LLM from Auckland). 
41 The works sampled were:  (a)  Hong Kong:  Betty M. Ho, PUBLIC COMPANIES AND THEIR EQUITY 
SECURITIES (1999); THE ANNOTATED ORDINANCES OF HONG KONG, Cap. 32:  COMPANIES ORDINANCE 
(2005); HALSBURY’S LAWS OF HONG KONG, vol 6(1):  COMPANIES AND CORPORATIONS (2005 Reissue); (b)  
Kenya:  Samuel G. Kirika, PRINCIPLES OF COMPANY LAW IN KENYA (1991); and John Joseph Ogola, 
COMPANY LAW (1997); (c)  Malaysia: Ben Chan Chong Choon & Philip Koh Tong Ngee, CHAN & KOH’S 
COMPANY LAW (looseleaf); Krishnan Arjunan, COMPANY LAW IN MALAYSIA – CASES AND COMMENTARY 
(1998) (this author explicitly tried to use as many Malaysian cases as possible, see introduction p. v); (d) 
Nigeria:  Akintunde Emiola, NIGERIAN COMPANY LAW (2001); Christopher S. Ola, COMPANY LAW IN 
NIGERIA (2002); and J. Olakunle Orojo, COMPANY LAW AND PRACTICE IN NIGERIA (3
rd ed. 1992); (e)  
Singapore:  Walter Woon, COMPANY LAW  (2
nd ed. 1997); HALSBURY’S LAWS OF SINGAPORE, vol. 6: 
COMPANY LAW (2006 Reissue). 
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Malaysia [UK, AUS]) or number at least as many as domestic cases (Nigeria [UK], 
Singapore [UK, AUS]) (main source of imports in square brackets).
42  Hong Kong is an 
extreme case – most of the authors did not receive any part of their (legal) university 
education in Hong Kong and often do not even work there.  The only exception is India, 
where domestic cases dominate.
43 
b)  Statutes 
The close connections are also reflected in statutory law.  As a result of successive 
copying, Irish company statutes are so similar to English ones that textbook authors 
writing in the year 2000 find it necessary to warn Irish lawyers against uncritical reliance 
on English textbooks.
44  Kenya’s Companies Act 1962, still in force, is largely a verbatim 
copy of the UK Companies Act 1948.
45  Similarly, the Indian Companies Act, 1956 is 
still based on the UK 1948 Act.
46  New Zealand’s company law was largely a copy of the 
UK 1948 Act until 1993, when a new statute inspired by the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act and the US Model Business Corporation Act was adopted.
47  Such a 
                                                 
42 In addition, Malaysia and Singapore also cite each other’s cases very frequently, which were published in 
the same case reporter until recently. 
43 The works sampled were Jehangir M.J. Sethna, INDIAN COMPANY LAW (10
th ed. 1987 revised by D.C. 
Singhania & P.S. Sangal); K.J. Rusthomji, COMPANY LAW (3
rd ed. 1991 revised by K.M.L. Nigam); and 
Sanjiv Agarwal, C.M. Bindal & Vijay K. Jain, COMMENTARY ON THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956 (2001).  The 
educational background of most of the authors could not be established, since the books generally do not 
note it and the authors do not show up in standard biography handbooks or internet searches.  Sethna has 
his LLM from Harvard.  The preface to his book mentions that he has “also discussed, at some length, the 
Company Law of five important countries of the world with which India has very important and close 
business relations:  these countries are – Japan, Federal Republic of Germany, France, USA, and Britain.”  
However, I did not find any references to the first three (Civil law) countries in the main text. 
44  Cf. Keane, supra note 36, para. 2.31:  “The differences between Irish and English legislation are 
sufficiently numerous and striking to make it a somewhat hazardous exercise for Irish practitioners and 
students to rely uncritically on the leading English textbooks.”  Similarly Forde, supra note 36, para. 1-39. 
45 See Kirika, supra note 41, at 1; Ogola, supra note 41, at vii (expressing his hope that Kenya will soon 
copy the intervening UK amendments). 
46 See Rustomji, supra note 43, at 5. 
47 See Buddle Findlay, supra note 40, para. 3 (new Act) and 11 (before 1993).  Cf. New Zealand Law 
Commission Report No. 16, COMPANY LAW REFORM:  TRANSITION AND REVISION xvii (September 1990) 
(mentioning the great assistance of the MBCA, and of the Canadian Dickerson report, while disclaiming 
that the draft presented is based on any one overseas model); also cf., Report No. 9, COMPANY LAW 
REFORM AND RESTATEMENT paras. 143-153 (June 1989) (explaining that harmonization with Australian 
law is not attempted because of the latter’s unorderly present state). 
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shift in orientation from the UK to other Commonwealth and US models can also be 
observed in Hong Kong, which until recently had slightly outdated “carbon copies” of 
UK companies and securities laws.
48 
Singapore’s 1967 Companies Act was identical to the Malaysian 1965 Act, which 
in turn was based on the 1961 Act of Victoria, Australia, which in turn was based on the 
UK 1948 Act
49; intervening amendments have complicated the picture, but the general 
reliance of Malaysian and Singaporean company law on Australian and other 
Commonwealth models remains.
50  Similarly, the securities laws of Malaysia and 
Singapore (adopted around 1983) were originally almost word-for-word copies from 
Australia, which, at least at the time, closely followed UK models.
51  While intervening 
amendments have again complicated the picture, the resemblance is still so close that The 
Annotated Statutes of Malaysia continuously refer (only) to the Australian counterparts 
and commentary on them.
52  And in Singapore, confusion has been caused by a cross-
reference in the statute to another paragraph number that was not adjusted when the 
statute was copied to Singapore, which uses different paragraph numbering.
53 
                                                 
48 Ho, supra note 41, at 18; also see H ALSBURY’S  LAWS OF HONG  KONG  6(1)
2005,  supra note 41, ¶¶ 
95.0001-0002.  The Review of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance Consultancy Report 1997, available 
at www.cr.gov.hk/en/standing/docs/concmpny.pdf (visited July 2006), recommends in its preface (letter by 
the reporters Cally Jordan and Ermanno Pascutto to Donald Tsang, Hong Kong Financial Secretary) “that 
Hong Kong replace the existing Companies Ordinance with a modern, streamlined Business Corporations 
Ordinance drawing on the most appropriate aspects of existing North American and Commonwealth 
models.” 
49 See HALSBURY’S LAWS OF SINGAPORE 6
2006, supra note 41, ¶ 70.009. 
50 Cf. for Malaysia Chan & Koh, supra note 41, para. 1.004:  “The present-day development of Malaysian 
company law is not confined to developments in the United Kingdom but also includes references to 
Commonwealth case law (in particular from Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore) and statutory 
developments.”  Also see the example of insider trading laws in Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore below 
in Part IV. 
51 See the annotations in The Annotated Statutes of Malaysia, Securities Industry Act 1983 (Act 280) (2005 
Reissue) on ss. 89 et seq. (which are the main Malaysian insider trading rules, see Low Chee Keong, 
SECURITIES  REGULATION IN MALAYSIA  137  (1997)) (Malaysia); and Woon, supra note 41, at 543 
(Singapore); for Australia’s following UK models, cf. Ford et al., supra note 37, ¶ 9.620 (discussing history 
of s. 1002 Corporations Law). 
52 See The Annotated Statutes of Malaysia, previous note. 
53 See Woon, supra note 41, at 543 n.62. 
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This is not to say that there is no variation between the different statutes.   
Australia in particular started to emancipate itself from strictly following English statutes 
early on.  Nevertheless, Australian (and other Commonwealth) courts still frequently 
refer to English judgments.
54  “Very often a provision in the [Australian] Corporations 
Act can be traced back to some pioneer legislation in the United Kingdom and expository 
views of courts there can be instructive.”
55  Indeed, reading company statutes of different 
Commonwealth jurisdictions is a succession of déjà vu’s.  For example, one finds a copy 
of the UK “oppression remedy” in all the Commonwealth jurisdictions sampled here, in 
different versions closely reflecting the timing, path, and type of copying discussed 
above.
56 
The probable cause of the enduring similarities is that even when the 
Commonwealth jurisdictions set out to develop their “own” company statute, they do so 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Ford et al., supra note 37, ¶ 1.020 for Australia; Chan & Koh, supra note 41, para. 1.004-005 
for Malaysia; and HALSBURY’S LAWS OF SINGAPORE 6
2006, supra note 41, ¶ 70.010 for Singapore. 
55 Ford et al., supra note 37, ¶ 1.020. 
56 The “oppression remedy” was first adopted in the UK in 1948 and is now found in ss. 459-461 
Companies Act 1985, incorporating a number of important subsequent amendments, see generally Davies, 
supra note 30, ch. 20.  In particular, the 1948 provision only mentioned “oppressive” “conduct.” In 1962, 
the Jenkins report suggested to broaden the scope of application to include “unfair prejudice,” which was 
eventually implemented as s. 75 Companies Act 1980, see A.J. Boyle, MINORITY  SHAREHOLDERS’ 
REMEDIES 90-91 (2002).  The old version of the “oppression remedy” mentioning only oppressive conduct 
is still found in countries that copied their statute from England before or just after the publication of the 
Jenkins report, such as India (s. 397 Companies Act, 1956; the provision adds, inter alia, prejudice to the 
public interest as an alternative criterion), Ireland (s. 205 Companies Act, 1963), and Kenya (s. 211 
Companies Act of 1962).  Statutes adopted after the Jenkins report also refer to “unfairly prejudicial” 
conduct, such as those of Malaysia (s. 181 Companies Act 1965), Singapore (s. 217 Companies Act of 
1967), Hong Kong (s. 168A Companies Ordinance), New Zealand (s. 174 Companies Act 1993), and 
Australia (s. 232 Corporations Act 2001).  The Hong Kong provision was adopted in 1978 based on the 
Jenkins report even though England itself had not yet implemented the recommendation, see Ho, supra 
note 41, at 656-657; ANNOTATED ORDINANCES OF HONG KONG, supra note 41, ¶ 168A.01.  For Malaysia 
and Singapore, I was not able to ascertain whether the original acts of 1965 and 1967 or subsequent 
amendments introduced the modern version of the oppression remedy.  The only sampled statute that 
genuinely innovated is Nigeria’s s. 300 Companies and Allied Matters Act, which enumerates specifically 
what kind of conduct is prohibited, without mentioning “oppressive” or “unfairly prejudicial.”  The reason 
given by the Nigerian Law Reform Commission for this and other changes was that English sources 
explaining the meaning of the statute became less and less accessible in Nigeria, see R EPORT ON THE 
REFORM OF NIGERIAN COMPANY LAW 1 (1991).  This reasoning underlines, rather than detracts from, the 
importance of English influence in the Commonwealth countries.  The importance of copying is underlined 
by the fact that most jurisdictions already had a (case law) remedy that, with appropriate refinements, could 
have assumed the role of the “oppression remedy”, in particular the fraud on the minority doctrine (cf., e.g., 
in Australia Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd  v Heath (1939)). 
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under the influence of other Common law models, and with the key involvement of 
people having studied in, or even being a national of, other Common law jurisdictions.
57  
For example, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission (1991) performed an “in depth 
study” of company legislation in the UK, Canada, India, Ghana, and the Caribbean before 
drafting the new Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990 (replacing a copy of the UK 
1948 Act
58); the Commission was chaired by J. Olakunle Orojo, who received his LLM 
from the University of London and is also a barrister there.
59  Of the two principal 
drafters of the New Zealand companies statute adopted in 1993, at least one had studied 
in Oxford and taught in Australia and the UK (David Goddard) (on the sources used in 
the process, see above).
60  Malaysia’s 1965 Act had been drafted with assistance from the 
Australian uniform legislation draftsman J.C. Finemore.
61  Hong Kong is again an 
extreme case: the official Review of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance completed in 
1997 was entrusted to two Canadians and principally completed at McGill University in 
Canada, with input from various other Commonwealth lawyers, including, e.g., the 
aforementioned New Zealander David Goddard.
62  And so on. 
The trend is not necessarily towards greater emancipation from the core’s models, 
nor for that matter is there a uniform trend away from the UK model towards Canadian or 
US models.  The Singaporean 2002 Report of the Company Legislation and Regulatory 
                                                 
57 Cf. Matson, supra note 6, at 778 et seq. (Commonwealth draftsmen look to other Commonwealth statutes 
as model). 
58 See Emiola, supra note 41, at 14-15. 
59 On the preparatory studies and the models considered, see Nigerian Law Reform Commission, supra 
note 56, at vii and 5; and on Orojo see id., introductory page, and Orojo, supra note 41, inner sleeve. 
60 Cf. New Zealand Law Commission Report No. 9, at 415, and Report No. 16, at xx (both supra note 47) 
(mentioning Richard Clarke and David Goddard as principal drafters); and Victoria University of 
Wellington, POSTGRADUATE  LAW  HANDBOOK  16  (2005) (available at 
www.vuw.ac.nz/home/prospectuses/law-pg-05.pdf, visited 11 September 2006) for a reference to 
Goddard’s education and teaching positions.  Note also that the only special presentations that the Law 
Commission received were seminars with a New Zealand lawyers practicing UK financial services 
regulation in London (Report No. 16, at xix), and an accounting specialist with New Zealand and US 
experience (id., at xx). 
61 See Chan & Koh, supra note 41, para. 1.001. 
62 Cf. the list of Working Party Members and the Preface to the Consultancy Report, supra note 48.  On 
Pascutto, in particular his education at the University of Toronto, see 
www.troutmansanders.com/att/bio.asp?id=637 (visited July 2006). 
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Framework Committee
63 recommended wholesale adoption of the soon-to-be-reformed 
UK Companies Act with some minor, notably to eliminate EU influences
64, and even 
advised to delay some of the Singaporean reforms to wait for the new UK provisions.
65  
Since “[a]s a global business centre, Singapore’s company law should continue to be 
modeled on one of the two globally recognizable common law models”, the only 
alternative model that was considered was Delaware law; it was ultimately rejected 
because Singaporean professionals were accustomed to the UK model and Singapore 
lacked the enforcement mechanisms (SEC, class actions, contingency fees) available in 
the US.
66 
2.  The French legal family 
In the French legal family, data is more difficult to obtain than in the Commonwealth.  
Some of the reasons might actually reflect deeper differences of legal style, such as the 
relative neglect of historical developments and the absence of published reports from the 
drafting of new statutes.  But some reasons are very trite.  For example, unlike in the 
Commonwealth countries, it is not customary in Latin America to list the author’s 
educational background in a book’s opening pages (in fact, this is the first element of 
diffusion:  neither is this customary in France or Spain).
67  This means that biographies of 
influential lawyers are much harder to sketch, because these people usually do not reach 
the necessary fame to appear in biographic lexica. 
The paper systematically surveys Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela in 
Latin America; Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the Maghreb; and OHADA, an 
                                                 
63 At least one Committee member, Frank Blue, was an attorney from the US. 
64 Para. 1.2. 
65 Para. 1.4. 
66 Para. 1.1, (b) and (c). 
67 Another trite reason might be that the anglophone Harvard Law School library, where I work, is better 
stocked for English than for Spanish language publications, although I have endevoured to have the library 
purchase every relevant work around.  If it turned out that the Latin American literature is in fact less dense 
than in other regions of the world (and there is anecdotal evidence for this, such as Mexican lawyers telling 
me that there is simply no book that they could recommend for companies or securities laws), this itself 
would teach something about the state of Latin American law. 
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organization of sixteen former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa for the adoption of 
uniform laws.  Information from other countries is noted where available. 
a)  Africa and the Middle East 
The former French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa remain francophone, at least in their 
official legal systems.  They continued to copy the French reforms even after their 
independence, if legislation did not stagnate.
68  Since 1993, sixteen French speaking sub-
Saharan African states adopt uniform commercial legislation in the OHADA.
69  T h e  
projects are far-reaching, and in particular a uniform company law closely following the 
French statute was adopted in 1997.
70 
Similarly, French language and French law remain a very strong influence in the 
Maghreb, at least in the area of business law.  Legal education is offered in both French 
and Arabic, legal publications are often bi-lingual, and French legal materials are widely 
cited.
71  For example, in Morocco, even corporate law treatises written in Arabic cite 
mostly French sources; occidental sources other than French are not cited at all.
72  A 
                                                 
68 See Mamadou Koné, LE NOUVEAU DROIT COMMERCIAL DES PAYS DE LA ZONE OHADA para. 12, 14 
(2003). 
69 See generally Joseph Issa-Sayegh, L’Intégration Juridique des États Africains dans la Zone Franc, 823 
PENANT 5 (1997) and 824 PENANT 125 (1997); and Alain Fénéon, Bilan et Perspectives de l’OHADA, 55 
REVUE JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE INDÉPENDANCE ET COOPÉRATION 243 (2001). 
70 See generally Koné, previous note; Jean Paillusseau, L’Acte Uniforme sur le Droit des Sociétés, 393(205) 
LES  PETITES  AFFICHES 19 (special issue 13 October 2004; and François Anoukaha, Abdoullah Cisse, 
Ndiaw Diouf, Joseete Nguebou Toukam, Paul-Gérard Pougoué & Moussa Samb, OHADA – SOCIÉTÉS 
COMMERCIALES ET G.I.E. 19 (¶ 25: “France and other countries of the EU”) (Brussels 2002). 
71 For Algeria, see generally Mohand Issad & Nacéra Saadi, Algérie, in LA CIRCULATION DU MODÈLE 
JURIDIQUE FRANÇAIS 221, 232 (Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant, vol. 44); and as an example of a 
bi-lingual legal publication, see the Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques Economiques et Politiques 
[Algerian Review of Legal, Economic, and Political Sciences] published by the University of Algier’s law 
faculty.  For Morocco, see generally Azzedine Kettani, Maroc,  id., 272, 272-273.  For Tunisia, see 
generally Derouichie-Ben Achour & Farouk Mechri, Tunisie, id. 283, 295 (1993); as an example of an 
official bi-lingual publication of a statute, see Imprimerie Officielle de la République Tunisienne, CODE 
DES SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES, Tunis 2001; and as an example of bilingual journals, see the Revue de la 
Jurisprudence et de la Legislation [Review of Court Decisions and Legislation] published by the Ministry 
of Justice, and the Revue Tunisienne de Droit [Tunisian Law Review] published by the Centre de 
Publication Universitaire [University Publication Center]. 
72 The works sampled were Hassania Cherkaoui, LA SOCIÉTÉ ANONYME (1997) (with a preface by Pierre 
Bézard, the president of a chamber of the French Cour de Cassation); Malika Talab & Michel Pabeun, LE 
DROIT MAROCAIN DES SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES (1997); Mohammed Ouzgane, LE NOUVEAU DROIT DES 
SOCIÉTÉS À RESPONSABILITÉ LIMITÉE AU MAROC (2001); Izz al-Dīn Binastī, LINKAL-SHARIKĀT FĪ AL-
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similar picture emerges in Tunisia.
73  Not surprisingly then, Maghrebi lawyers look to 
French precedents, both judicial and legislative, for solutions to new problems, even 
though the Arabic-trained part of the legal profession may at times resist this.
74   
To a lesser extent, other former French colonies or protectorates in the Arab world 
also continue to be influenced by France.
75 
b)  Latin America 
Latin America receives materials not only from civil law countries but also from the US, 
and seems to transform these materials more than other regions covered above.  Three 
reasons suggest themselves for this.  For one thing, most of the Latin American countries 
have been independent for much longer than other former colonies, which gave them the 
time to emancipate themselves from the core countries’ legal models (inversely, one may 
find the remaining foreign influences all the more surprising).
76  Second, economically 
and militarily, Latin America has been dominated by its neighbor, the US, for a good 
century, which could not but direct attention to US models.  Third, the former colonizers, 
                                                                                                                                                 
TASHRĪ AL-MAGHRIBĪ WA-AL-MUQĀRAN  : DIRĀSAH MUQĀRANAH WA-ALÁ  ḍAW AL-MUSTAJIDDĀT AL-
TASHRĪĪYAH AL-RĀHINAH FĪ AL-MAGHRIB (Casablanca 1996) [Corporations in Moroccan Legislation and 
other countries: a comparative study in light of current legislative developments in Morocco]; Muḥammad 
Bilmualim, LINKAL-SHUFAH FĪ ASHUM SHARIKĀT AL-MUSĀHAMAH : DIRĀSAH LIL-MĀDATAYN 253 WA 257 
MIN QĀNŪN SHARIKĀT AL-MUSĀHAMAH AL-MAGHRIBĪ (Rabat 2007) [Preemptive rights in public 
corporations: a study of articles 253 and 257 of the Moroccan Law of Corporations]. 
73 I did not have access to treatises.  However, I could sample two recent law review articles: Nouri Mzid, 
Groupes de sociétés et relations de travail, 42(9) REVUE DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ET DE LA LEGISLATION 9 
[Corporate groups and labor relations] (citing both French and Tunisian court decisions, five Tunisian 
doctrinal pieces, and many more French [cf., e.g., footnote 1]); and Taoufik Ben Nasr, Aspects de la Fusion 
dans le Code des Sociétés Commerciales, [2005] REVUE  TUNISIENNE DE DROIT 67 [Some Aspects of 
Mergers in the Corporate Law Code] (citing only two Tunisian court decisions and three Tunisian pieces of 
doctrinal writings, and for the rest French writers). 
74 See for Algeria Issad & Saadi, previous note, at 230 (reporting inter alia that the Algerian commercial 
code of 1975, which contained Algeria’s corporate law, was a simplified version of the French code of the 
time); for Morocco Kettani, previous note, at 273; for Tunisia Achour & Mechri, previous note, at 298-299.   
75 See for Egypt, Mohamed El Sayed Arafa, Égzpte, in LA CIRCULATION DU MODÈLE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAIS 
234 (Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant, vol. 44); for Lebanon, Pierre Gannagé, Liban, in id. 253; for 
Syria, Jacques El Hakim, Syrie, in id. 275; and generally Philippe Ardant, Rapport Introductif, in id. 215. 
76 This is particularly true in those countries, like Argentina, that were very wealthy during at least some of 
their independence, so that enough resources could have been available for legal development. 
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Spain and Portugal, were economic backwaters and dictatorships for much of the 20
th 
century, which limited the appeal of transplants from there.
77, 
78   
Latin American observers report that to this day, European, especially French, 
treatises are considered the pinnacle of legal authority in Latin America, even before the 
domestic ones, and as such they are constantly cited by Latin American lawyers.
79  
Written work in law school training throughout Latin America was reported to be mere 
cut-and-paste from German, French, Italian, and Spanish authors as late as in 1975.
80  
Even judges’ role models (in particular of activist judges) are still thought to be found in 
Italy and Spain, rather than in the US.
81 
Not surprisingly then, Latin American legal works are full of references to 
European sources.  For example, the standard Venezuelan work on corporate law (2004) 
cites foreign sources almost exclusively, mostly Argentinean, French, Italian, and 
                                                 
77 As soon as Spain reverted to democracy, it reemerged as a legal influence in Latin America, see Diego 
López-Medina, COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE – RECEPTION AND MISREADING OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
THEORY IN LATIN AMERICA 39 n.73 and 398 (undated) (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard Law 
School) (on file with the Harvard Law Library).  In particular, the 1978 Spanish Constitution was highly 
influential in the Latin American democratization of the 1980s (id.), e.g., the expression that judges are 
only subject to “el emperio de la ley” (Art. 117.1 Spanish Constitution; cf. id., 345 n.30).   
78 Similarly, Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 870-882 (2003) (with note 
159) argues that Latin American countries modeled their constitutions on the US because at the time they 
adopted them, a suitable, i.e., republican and stable, European model was lacking.  By contrast, when 
administrative law started to grow in the late 19
th century, France had stabilized and could provide a 
suitable model.  Miller also argues that as a consequence, still today Argentinian constitutional lawyers 
speak English, studied in the US, and advocate US models, while the administrative lawyers speak French, 
teach in Spain, and advocate French models.  This last point is put into doubt by the report in López-
Medina, previous note, at 350 n.49 of similarly divided loyalties to US and European models in Colombia, 
although the Colombian constitution follows an Austrian model. 
79 See, e.g., López-Medina, supra note 77, at 396-397 (cf. n.110:  during a field trip to Bolivia, Colombian 
students were examined by a Bolivian judge on the content of Planiol, one of the foremost French treatises 
on civil law). 
80 Kenneth L. Karst & Keith S. Rosenn, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA – A CASE BOOK 67 
(1975). 
81 See Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, LATIN AMERICAN LAWYERS:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 135 (2006); but 
see López-Medina, supra note 77, at 430 for a different assessment (progressive judges now take US 
judges, in particular the Warren court, as role models, at least in Colombia). 
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Spanish, with isolated citations to UK and US titles.
82  The author, Alfredo Morles 
Hernández, who studied in both the US and France, was the president of the commission 
that produced the draft of a new general corporations law (1988), so his citation practice 
presumably reflects on the materials considered in that drafting process.
83  Similarly, the 
current Argentinean corporate law statute (law no. 19.550 of 1972) was influenced by 
French, Italian and German, rather than US input.
84  In a colloquium of the drafting 
committee in 1968, speakers discussed mainly German and Italian law, as well as French, 
Spanish, Brazilian, Mexican and Uruguayan codes and drafts, with only one or two 
references to UK or US law.
85  For example, only Italian, Spanish, Mexican, and German 
rules were considered as benchmarks for setting the percentage of shares to call an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.
86  And while Argentinean corporate law treatises in 
the 1990s only contain occasional references to foreign sources (all of them to 
Continental European authors)
87, about half the references in Chilean works of the time 
are to foreign sources from Continental Europe and Latin America (primarily 
Argentinean and Spanish; German treatises only in translation).
88 
At the same time, there has always been US influence, and it has been increasing 
in the second half of the 20
th century, as young Latin American lawyers increasingly went 
                                                 
82 The work in question is Alfredo Morles Hernandez, 2 CURSO DE DERECHO  MERCANTIL  – LAS 
SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES (7
th ed. 2004).  The citation pattern in Manuel Acedo Mendoza & Luisa Teresa 
Acedo de Lepervanche, LA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA (3
rd ed. 1996) is similar. 
83 For Hernández’s biography, see http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfredo_Morles_Hernández (visited April 
2009). 
84  See Guillermo Cabanellas de las Cuevas, INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO  SOCIETARIO vol. 1, 140-144 
(1993), also for the influences before 1971. 
85 Colloquium held on 2-4 September 1968 at the Buenos Aires Law Faculty, with interventions by the 
Minister of Justice Conrado Etchebarne and the members of the drafting committee Issac Halperin, Horacio 
P. Fargosi, Carlos Odriozola, Gervasio R. Colombres, and Enrique Zaldivar, printed in Anteproyecto de Ley 
de Sociedades Comerciales.  Su Análisis, 1 REVISTA DEL DERECHO COMERCIAL Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 
587 (1968). 
86 Odriozola, previous note, at 609. 
87 The works sampled were Roberto A. Muguillo, LEY DE SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES (2005); Ricardo 
Augusto Nissen, LEY DE SOCIEDADES  COMERCIALES vol. 5 (2
nd ed. 1996); and Alberto Victor Veron, 
SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES vol. 5 (1996). 
88 The works sampled were Alvaro Puelma Accorsi, SOCIEDADES (1996); and Ricardo Sandoval Lopez, 
DERECHO COMERCIAL vol. 1 (4
th ed. 1994). 
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to the US for graduate legal studies, rather than to Europe as their fathers had done.
89  
Such changes have in part been actively promoted by the US since the 1950s.
90  Some 
statutes have been copied from the US, such as the Mexican securities law in 1953 or the 
Argentinean bankruptcy law in 1995.
91  In corporate law, US influence has increasingly 
made itself felt in the last 30 years.  The Brazilian company law of 1976, the Chilean 
company law of 1981, and the Colombian company law of 1995 are generally said to 
incorporate some US features.
92 
The changing lineage of the Colombian corporate law statute is mirrored in, and 
can perhaps be traced to, the writings of the leading Colombian corporate lawyers.  While 
the 1996 book by the principal draftsman of the 1995 law, Reyes Villamizar, cites as 
many US as foreign civil law sources
93, the 2002 books by his predecessor as 
                                                 
89 See Matthew C. Mirow, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 168 and 187 (2004).  At the same time, the US influence 
may be weaker than it sometimes appears.  For example, recent reforms enabling prosecutors to make 
“deals” with criminal defendants involved US funds, but the main initiator of the reforms, Argentinian law 
professor Julio B.J. Maier, completed graduate studies in Germany and returned to Germany many times 
during the reform activities; European legal development organizations were heavily involved in the 
project, notably in setting up the Iberian American Institute of Procedural Law that carried the reforms 
throughout Latin America; and the ultimate reform product resembles German criminal procedure (sections 
153 et seq. of the German Code of Criminal Procedure) much more than it resembles US criminal 
procedure (see Langer, supra note 20, at 637 et seq., 642 et seq., 649 et seq., 652 et seq.).  By contrast, few 
of the hundreds of participants in the reform movements seem to have had exposure to US law, beyond 
USAID’s involvement in funding the project.  The German model, in turn, was not copied from the US.  
Even a different German practice, so far not regulated by the German Code of Criminal Procedure and 
often discussed as “plea bargains” in Germany, arose endogenously, i.e., “as a response to practical needs, 
rather than as a product of deep cultural influences of the American system over the German one,” see 
Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and 
the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 39 (2004).  Langer emphasizes 
that “Americanization” does not accurately describe these processes, but perhaps even characterizing them 
as the outcome of attenuated and mitigated American influence, as Langer does, exaggerates the American 
role. 
90 See Mirow, previous note, at 187-89. 
91 On Mexico, see Mirow, supra note 89, at 169; on Argentina, see Miller, supra note 78, at 877 n.155. 
92 See, e.g., Accorsi, supra note 88, at 398 for Argentina; and Arnoldo Wald, Brézil, in LA CIRCULATION DU 
MODÈLE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAIS 125, 126 (Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant, vol. 44) for Brazil.  In 
scholarship, the US influence can be seen, e.g., in Guillermo Carey Bustamante, DE LA SOCIEDAD 
ANONIMA Y LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DE LOS DIRECTORES (1992), who does not only cite US sources 
(including cases and statutes), but partly follows a US structure of exposition (duty of diligence, duty of 
loyalty, etc.) – interestingly, Carey Bustamante was professor of economics within the law faculty. 
93  Cf. Francisco Reyes de Villamizar, REFORMA DEL REGIMEN DE SOCIEDADES Y CONCURSOS (1996).   
Reyes (who got his LLM from Miami) was the Superintendente de Sociedades and active at the Ministry of 
Justice during the reform (see p. 16 of the book and 
http://derecho.uniandes.edu.co/derecho1/export/derecho/nosotros/cuerpodoc/, 
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Superintendente de Sociedades and legislative draftsman, José Ignacio Narváez García, 
cite many European civil law, very few Colombian, and no US sources.
94  M o r e  
generally, the shift to US legislative models may have been delayed as compared to the 
shift in educational patterns by the fact that drafting statutes is usually entrusted to older, 
experienced lawyers, who, as the Argentine committee in 1968, still had received their 
education in, or with an eye to, Europe. 
Interestingly, Latin American lawyers tend to cite core materials that are in one 
way or another outdated, and use these materials in a discourse that is of an entirely 
different type than the discourse in the source countries, at least the contemporary 
discourse in the source countries.  In particular, the European-oriented Latin American 
corporate law treatises of the 1990s and early 2000s still indulge in theoretical questions 
such as the nature of the corporation citing many Europeans from the first half of the 20
th 
or even the 19
th century (such as Gierke), but they cite few if any court decisions or 
modern  European works (it is also noteworthy that they never cite foreign court 
decisions).  By contrast, modern European treatises tend to say nothing on the theoretical 
questions, rarely if ever cite the older works, and focus instead intensely on the actual 
working of the corporate law, citing and discussing innumerable court decisions and 
(modern) doctrinal commentary thereon.
95  Those Latin American treatises that use US 
materials (e.g., Reyes Villamizar in Colombia, or Carey Bustamante in Chile) tend to cite 
more modern works and even a few US cases, but the number of cases cited is minuscule 
compared to US doctrinal works,
96 and there is no trace of the profound transformation of 
US corporate law scholarship by law & economics over the last three decades.  So in 
spite of the invocation of authorities from the core countries, the discourse is distinctively 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=facultyandresearch.visitingfaculty, and 
http://www.cavelier.com/area_juridica/nuestrosases/reyesfrancisco.htm (visited July 2006)).  Still, Reyes 
de Villamizar cites France as the main inspiration of the new Colombian corporate law statute (id. 37). 
94 José Ignacio Narváez García, DERECHO  MERCANTIL  COLOMBIANO,   III.  TEORÍA  GENERAL DE LAS 
SOCIEDADES (9
th ed 2002); IV. TIPOS DE SOCIEDAD (2
nd ed 2002). 
95 See, e.g., Ripert & Roblot, supra note 29, and Schmidt, supra note 29. 
96 See, e.g., Clarkt, supra note 29. 
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Latin American.
97  The Latin Americans also read each other, and often copy statutes 
from another Latin American country.
98 
II. DIFFUSION CHANNELS 
What drives the formal diffusion documented in the previous Part?  Part III below will 
discuss this question in a theoretical perspective.  To prepare that discussion, this Part 
will provide some more data on possible channels. 
Diffusion can be driven by a vast variety of factors.  For example, US dominance 
in the entertainment industry might drive diffusion of US-style criminal justice by 
providing frequent examples in US television shows and movies.
99  This Part only looks 
at three channels that are easy to capture with data, and that appear particularly relevant: 
organizations specifically designed to transport law across borders, trade flows and cross-
border investment, and student flows. 
For trade flows and cross-border investment, economists have already done the 
work, documenting a concentration of trade and investment between countries of same 
legal origin, above and beyond a concentration of trade between colonizers and their 
                                                 
97 To some extent, this was already the case at the time the Latin American legal systems formed.  Even 
though Latin America was mostly colonized by the Spanish and the Portuguese, the main model was the 
French civil code.  Moreover, inspite of its enormous prestige at the time, the French code was not simply 
copied but woven into a domestic blend together with certain other European sources.because that 
formation saw the adoption of civil codes modeled on (not: copied from) the French civil code.  See Eugen 
Bucher, Zu Europa gehört auch Lateinamerika!, 12 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 515 
(2004) (for examples of copying between Latin American countries, see, e.g., note 33). 
98 Cf. generally Mirow, supra note 89, at 167-70 (noting the increased reliance of Latin American countries 
on each others’ legal products in the 20
th century).  Argentina developed a good amount of domestic legal 
scholarship and drafted its own codes, which are often cited and copied, respectively, throughout Latin 
America.  Certain home-grown textbooks were used throughout Latin America (see Pérez-Perdomo, supra 
note 81, at 87, mentioning in particular Belló in the 19
th century, and Jimenez de Asua’s “La ley y el delito” 
(1954)  in the 20
th century), and there is now also some limited cooperation in private law-making, as in the 
Ibero-American Institute and Model Code of Procedure Law, on which see José Barbosa Moreia,  Le code-
modèle de procédure civile pour l’Amérique Latine de l’Institut Ibero-américain de Droit Processuel, 3 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL 437 (1998). 
99 For an example of the diffusion of criminal law, see Langer, supra note 89.  As discussed supra note 89, 
however, Langer’s attribution of the changes to a US model is open to question. 
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former colonies.
100  The following paragraphs document similar patterns in student flows 
and legal cooperation. 
A.  Legal cooperation and development aid 
The main developed Western European and North American countries are all actively 
promoting legal development around the world, primarily in business and commercial 
law.
101  With the exception of activities in the formerly socialist transition countries
102, 
all of these organizations are strongly focused on periphery countries of their own legal 
family.  In theory, foreign advise need not favor the advisor’s native legislative models, 
or promote any foreign model for that matter.  In reality, however, foreign legal 
consultants’ recommendations are generally at least strongly influenced by their home 
law.
103  The reason need not be legal imperialism.  Even the most well-meaning 
consultant will have difficulties working with a foreign model, and the familiar home 
model will usually seem as good as any other to the consultant.  Hence even highly 
sophisticated advisors critical of parochial biases in comparative law end up proposing 
models inspired by their home country’s laws.
104  Less sophisticated advisors recommend 
even those aspects of their home model that are completely unsuited to the recipient 
country.
 105 
                                                 
100 See for trade most recently and convincingly Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein, 
Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 441 (2008), and for 
investment Jordan I. Siegel, Amir N. Licht & Shalom H. Schwartz, Egalitarianism and International 
Investment, working paper, Harvard Business School, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=899082, at 24-
25 and Table 5 (2008). 
101 See John C. Reitz, Systems Mixing and in Transition:  Import and Export of Legal Models, in John W. 
Bridge ed., COMPARATIVE LAW FACING THE 21
ST CENTURY 57, 67 and 70 et seq. (2001). 
102 Cf. the references in note 25 supra. 
103 See, e.g., deLisle, supra note 25, especially at 203-204 
104 See, e.g., the confession of Günther Frankenberg on his advise given to the Albanian government for the 
new Albanian administrative procedure code:  Günther Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise:  Identity & 
Politics in Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 259. 
105 The results are at times grotesque.  For example, deLisle, supra note 25, at 180, tells of US lawyers 
proposing US-style securities regulation (the uncommented text of which fills multiple loose-leaf volumes) 
to Mongolia, a country without a stock exchange at the time.  Worse, French consultants inserted 
provisions requiring the intervention of notaries into the company law of Laos, a country that, at that time, 
did not have any notaries, see Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting Legislation for Development:  
Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 11 n.54 (1996). 
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In the UK, legal development aid is primarily channeled through the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL).
106  The BIICL has a 
Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service exclusively for assisting Common law 
countries.
107  Of the 27 countries that received BIICL assistance in the last 5 years, 20 
belong to the Common law family
108, and all but one of those that did not received aid 
under unusual circumstances.
109 
Another unifying force for the common law family is the Commonwealth.   
Commonwealth institutions provide formal settings of exchange.
110  The Commonwealth 
Secretariat’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs Division provides model statutes, among 
other things
111, and the Economic and Legal Section of the Special Advisory Services 
Division supports private sector development through activities including in particular the 
design of regulatory frameworks for financial markets.
112  Furthermore, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council remained the jurisdiction of last resort in many 
Commonwealth countries long after independence, in some cases to this day.  This not 
                                                 
106 See generally Esin Örücü, The United Kingdom as an Importer and Exporter of Legal Models in the 
Context of Reciprocal Influences and Evolving Legal Systems, in John W. Bridge ed., UK LAW FOR THE 
MILLENIUM 206 (2
nd ed., 2000), with references to other institutions involved, such as the British Council 
(which focuses on governance issues). 
107 See Annual Report 2005, at 106-107 (available at http://www.biicl.org/files/341_report_2005.pdf).  On 
the activities of the Commonwealth Secretariat itself, see below Section I.B.1. 
108 Cf. www.biicl.org/legalconsultants/ (visited 26 July 2006). 
109 Afghanistan is a current hot spot, where British troops are currently committed.  In Iran, BIICL advises 
on human rightan rights as contractor for the EU (see www.biicl.org/iran/ (visited 26 July 2006)).   
Armenia, China, Mongolia and Russia are transition countries (on which more in the main text below).  
The only “normal” case where BIICL advises in a “foreign” legal family is Indonesia. 
110 In particular, member countries’ top lawyers meet annually in the Commonwealth Law Conference 
(www.commonwealthlawyers.com/CLC.asp, visited July 2006), and the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and 
Judges’ Association provides a permanent forum of exchange (www.cmja.org). 
111 Cf. www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/20728/151470/lcad/ (visited July 2006). 
112  Cf. the Maldives, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania projects described at 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/153522/141772/els_articles/, and on the Economic and Legal 
Section generally www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/153522/economic_and_legal_services/ (both visited 
July 2006). 
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only enhanced the credibility of these countries’ judicial systems, it also ensured a 
constant exchange of legal ideas.
113 
The case of Hong Kong deserves special mention.  Although Hong Kong is 
treated as an independent observation throughout the legal origins literature, Hong Kong 
was under formal British rule until 1997.  English common law and equity were formally 
in force in as far as applicable to the circumstances in Hong Kong, and the practice of 
staffing the Hong Kong courts almost exclusively with expatriates from England or other 
Commonwealth countries ensured that Hong Kong law closely followed English 
developments and minimized the influence of Chinese law.
114 
On the French side, the sub-directorate for international affairs of the French 
National Magistrates’ School (ENM-SDI), founded in the late 1950s to train judges in the 
newly independent former French colonies, cooperates almost exclusively with Civil law 
countries, training about 3,000 foreign judges per year.
115  Likewise, the information 
dissemination by the legal branch of the Organisation internationale de la francophonie 
is explicitly aimed only at French-speaking (and hence Civil law) countries
116, and the 
Maisons du droit (houses of law) seem to be found only in civil law countries.
117 
Similarly, the activities of the German Foundation for International Legal 
Cooperation (IRZ) are divided into “States in Central and Eastern Europe, Newly 
                                                 
113 For an overview of the Judicial Committee and empirical evidence of its beneficial effect for the 
countries that accepted its jurisdiction, see Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, Improving 
credibility by delegating judicial competence – the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 82 
J. DEV. ECON. 348 (2007). 
114  See Robert Jagtenberg, The Honoratiores and Mobility of Law:  The Example of Hong Kong, in 
Jagtenberg et al., supra note 8, at 85. 
115 See http://www.enm.justice.fr/relations_internationales/chiffres.htm (list of countries where ENM-SDI 
is active) and http://www.enm.justice.fr/relations_internationales/programme/programme2006.pdf, p. 2 
(number of judges trained).  Information on French aid directly to legislation is not readily available, but it 
stands to reason that it is probably heavily focused on the former French colonies, since even non-legal 
development aid from France is highly concentrated on these countries, cf. the lists of projects at 
http://www.afd.fr/jahia/Jahia/home/NosProjets/accessecteur/cache/offonce;jsessionid=E3841C5DCD22561
C6C8DA09DFA4605C5 (visited 10 September 2006). 
116 http://droit.francophonie.org/df-web/. 
117 There is one in Vietnam, see www.maisondudroit.org, and a Casa Franco-Andina de Derecho in Latin 
America, see López-Medina, supra note 77, at 341 n.22. 
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Independent States of the former Soviet Union, States in South Eastern Europe”
 118, all of 
which are Civil law Countries, and many of them are often counted as belonging to the 
German legal family.  The Dutch Center for International Legal Cooperation has projects 
only in Civil law countries, mostly transition countries and the former Dutch colony 
Indonesia.
119 
Particularly close legislative cooperation can be found in Scandinavia.
120  The 
five Scandinavian countries develop much important private law legislation jointly, even 
though each country may ultimately deviate from the commonly agreed template.  Such 
legislative cooperation is formally carried out through the Nordic Council and enshrined 
in the Helsinki Agreement of 1962, which calls for the “greatest possible uniformity of 
law in the area of private law”.
121  Even more important, however, is the extensive 
informal cooperation of people active in the national legislative processes.
122  The annual 
Scandinavian “juristmøders” (meeting of lawyers) facilitates such ties.  As one Finnish 
commentator states:  “As a result [of Scandinavian legislative cooperation], the 
development of Finnish legislation has retained its Scandinavian features, and for this 
reason, the legal system of present-day Finland is basically and largely the same [sic] that 
in Scandinavia.”
123 
The only country whose legal advisory/cooperative work is not focused on its 
own legal family is the US, which has been active all over the world, notably in Latin 
                                                 
118 www.irz.de/startseite_e.htm (visited July 2006).  In the 1990s, Germany also provided legal 
development aid to transition countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia through its Corporation for 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ) with the project “Law Reform in Transition States” (and the people involved 
did Moldova and Mongolia before) (cf. www.jura.uni-bremen.de/institute/gtz.htm (visited July 2006)). 
119 See www.cilc.nl/projects.html (visited July 2006). 
120 On Nordic legislative cooperation generally, see Gebhard Carsten, Europäische Integration und 
nordische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet des Zivilrechts, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES 
PRIVATRECHT 335 (1993); Frantz Wilhelm Wendt, COOPERATION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 257 et seq. 
(1980); and Hellner, Unification in Scandinavia, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 88 (1968). 
121  Cf. www.norden.org and http://www.norden.org/pub/velfaerd/lagstiftning/sk/US2002472.pdf (visited 
July 2006). 
122 See Carsten, supra note 120. 
123 Yrjö Blomstedt, A Historical Background of the Finnish Legal System, in Jaakko Uotila ed., THE 
FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM 26, 38 (2
nd ed. 1985, Leena Lehto transl.). 
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America and transition economies.
124  However, outside of the transition economies, US 
advise seems to have focused on rule-of-law projects, rather than on business law.
125 
B.  Student migration 
The survey of treatise authors and legislative draftsmen in Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2 
revealed that many of them had obtained all or part of their legal education abroad in a 
core country of the same legal family.  Unfortunately, systematic data specifically on the 
migration of law students is unavailable.  But UNESCO collects annual data on student 
migration in general (confounding all majors), by country of origin to the 10 most 
popular places to study: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States.
126  The table below analyzes these 
data.  (The legal family membership data used here may be overinclusive by the 
standards laid out in Section I.A above, but to the extent this is the case, it would only 
bias the results towards zero.) 
Student migration 
  Dependent variable: ln[1+(number of students from 
sender country studying in host country, average 
2001-2005)] 
Host and sender country from same legal family   .83*** 
(.12) 
1.20*** 
(.08) 
 .33*** 
(.12) 
Host country is colonizer of sender country    3.25*** 
(.22) 
Sender country fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes 
                                                 
124 For an overview of US legal development aid, see deLisle, supra note 25, and for the earlier “Law and 
Development” movement of the 1960s, see James A. Gardner, LEGAL IMPERIALISM – AMERICAN LAWYERS 
AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980). 
125 Cf. the project descriptions for the Asian, African and Latin American projects of the American Bar 
Association at www.abanet.org/aba-asia/home.html, www.abanet.org/aba-africa/home.html, and 
www.abanet.org/lalic/home.html (visited July 2006). 
126 Available at http://stats.uis.unesco.org/ (accessed 02/05/2009).  Naturally, the number of students 
received varies greatly between these countries:  while the US receives on average over 2,700 students per 
country per year, Portugal only receives 76. 
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Host country dummies  No Yes  Yes 
Number of host-sender pairs  2030 2030 2030 
R
2  .02 .43 .78 
The table shows estimated coefficients and OLS standard errors from fixed-effects regressions.   
Observations where host and sender country are identical are omitted from the sample.  The colonizer is 
defined as the last colonizer before independence.  Data on colonizers and common legal family come from 
the data set of Klerman et al., supra note 3. 
As shown in these simple fixed-effects regressions, more than twice (e
.83=2.29) as 
many students from any country studying abroad study in a country of the same legal 
family as in a country of a different legal family (first column).  In fact, holding the 
attraction of host countries fixed (second column), the effect is even larger – to the extent 
student migration flows from any given country deviate from the global average, 3.3 
times more students go to a country of the same legal family.  As the third column 
reveals, most of the effect is accounted for by colonial ties – students from former 
colonies are 25 times more likely to study in a university of the former colonizing power 
than elsewhere, holding the attraction of host countries fixed.  Remarkably, however, the 
legal family effect is still noticeable above and beyond the colonizer effect.  It stands to 
reason that if anything, these data will considerably underestimate the role of a shared 
legal family.  While most majors’ knowledge is easily transferable – e.g., engineering or, 
subject to licensing requirements, medical knowledge –, legal knowledge is still 
overwhelmingly national or, as shown above, at least specific to legal families. 
Some readers of drafts of this paper have wondered how the evidence above 
relates to the fact that thousands of LL.M. students from all over the world, including 
civil law countries, come to study law at US law schools every year.  The first thing to 
note in relation to the LL.M. as a one-year graduate degree is that it is unlikely to leave 
nearly as deep an impact on the students as their multi-year primary legal education in 
universities of (usually) their own legal family.  Moreover, at least at Harvard Law 
School, the pattern for general student migration shown above also holds true for the 
LL.M. population.  For example, over the last five years (2005-2009), Harvard Law 
School’s LL.M. program welcomed 48 students from the UK (population 59m) and 31 
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from Australia (population 6m) as opposed to only 30 from Germany (population 83m), 
26 from France (population 60m), and 19 from Brazil (population 178m).
127   
III. MAKING SENSE OF FORMAL DIFFUSION 
Having documented pervasive formal diffusion and some of its possible channels in the 
previous Parts, the paper now turns to interpret these facts in view of the crucial question: 
is there substantive diffusion along legal family lines? 
Unlike formal diffusion, substantive diffusion is invisible:  a country can slavishly 
follow a foreign model without copying a foreign statute or ever explicitly 
acknowledging – or even being conscious of – a foreign influence; inversely, a country 
can develop a policy totally autonomously and yet utilize foreign statutory language for 
technical simplicity or as a decoy.  Nevertheless, the existence of formal diffusion 
informs the discussion of substantive diffusion.  In particular, theories that deny 
substantive diffusion must explain why formal diffusion occurs even though it is, 
according to these theories, substantively irrelevant.
128  Subpart III.A reviews this 
question in its general form.  Subpart III.B turns to interpreting the pattern of legal family 
differences of formal diffusion documented above.  The conclusion of this discussion will 
be that the existence of substantive diffusion and some role of the legal families is hard to 
deny.  The quantitative importance of such diffusion can hardly be ascertained 
theoretically.
129  It is an empirical question.  For the time being, the legal origins 
literature provides reason to believe that diffusion is indeed quantitatively important – 
                                                 
127 Martin Gelter has coded the data of all the Graduate Program participants for 2002-2004 (including 
S.J.D.s and Visiting Researchers).  His data (on file with the author) show that common law countries are 
marginally overrepresented, with details depending on specifications etc. 
128 See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 489 (1995).  Ewald argues that the force of the argument of Watson, supra note 5 and other writings, 
comes from his documentation of instances of legal borrowing that do not fit into existing theories and 
thereby challenge them. 
129 This seems to be a major reason why comparativists have been debating the relevance of legal 
transplants so passionately.  Cf. Watson, supra note 5; Abel, supra note 21; and Legrand, supra note 131; 
Ewald, previous note (distinguishing a “Strong Watson” who would implausibly claim that law always 
develops autonomously by transplantation independently of social pressures and needs, and a “Weak 
Watson” who would only claim that this happens sometimes). 
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unless another theory can be marshaled to explain the differences documented in that 
literature, they should be attributed to diffusion. 
A.  Formal diffusion in general 
1.  Dimensions of the relationship between foreign models and domestic 
law 
A discussion of the relationship between foreign models and domestic law must sharply 
distinguish two dimensions.  One dimension is mere similarity, i.e., whether the domestic 
law ends up being similar to the foreign model.  The other dimension is influence 
properly speaking, i.e., whether the foreign model has any causal role in shaping the 
substantive content of the domestic law.  Different processes produce different 
combinations of the two dimensions of similarity and influence.  Schematically, the 
different combinations of (substantive) similarity and influence can be represented in a 
little diagram.  The processes mentioned in the four boxes, particularly in the right 
column, should be taken as examples, rather than exhaustive.
130 
    Substantive similarity 
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This schematic description of the possibilities needs to be explained and refined in 
a number of ways. 
First, the question being asked here is merely whether the foreign model and the 
domestic law can be similar in their actual operation.  (In principle, one could have a 
                                                 
130 For an attempt to create a typology of legal transplants, see Miller, supra note 78. 
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third column on the left asking whether the two countries’ laws are identical.)  There has 
at times been heated argument in comparative law about the question whether the 
domestic copy of a foreign law (“transplant”) could ever be identical to the original.
131  
The answer to that question is obviously no.  (In terms of discourse, the very act of 
copying means that the recipient country is doing something different than the origin 
country.
132)  The real question is whether they can at least be expected to be similar.
133  
Some have argued that this is not the case in certain instances, such as the transplantation 
of the concept of “good faith” to England through European directives.
134  In general, 
however, it is reasonable to assume that copying a foreign model will yield results that go 
at least in the right direction.
135  Similarly, when formally identical law is transplanted 
(i.e., a statute is copied), only someone who denies all constraining power of a text could 
argue that the operation of the transplant will be completely random, rather than at least 
directionally similar to the original. 
Second, similarity is a question of degree (inversely, one could phrase this in 
terms of “difference”).  To judge the real world importance of foreign influence, this 
question is obviously crucial.  It can be bracketed, however, in a discussion of the 
theoretical possibilities of foreign influence.  (In principle, it can also be bracketed in 
empirical tests as long as the similarity is strong enough to show up in the data and the 
null hypothesis is that there is no systematic similarity.) 
                                                 
131 Cf. in particular Pierre Legrand, What “Legal Transplants”?, in Nelken & Feest, supra note 8, 55 
(arguing that legal transplantation is impossible because the “transplant” changes during the process). 
132 For example, Latin American lawyers that receive legal concepts from French authors as valid 
elaborations of Latin American law must be doing something profoundly different than the French because 
the French are working with different, French legislative materials.  Cf. López-Medina, supra note 77, at 
94 et seq., 397; id., TEORÍA IMPURA DEL DERECHO 138 et seq. (2004) (pointing out that Latin American 
lawyers’ claims about the originality of the Bello code are inconsistent with their simultaneous use of 
French doctrinal materials for interpreting this “original” code). 
133  Cf. Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European Private Law, 4.4 ELECTRONIC  J.  COMP.  L. 
(December 2000), available at www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html (arguing that the transplant obviously 
changes in the process but that this does not go as far as transformiing it into something unrecognizable).  
134 See Günther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998) (arguing in the spirit of chaos theory that the dynamics triggered 
by importing an alien element will result in new cleavages). 
135 But see Teubner, previous note. 
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Third, as usual in social science, the theoretical hypotheses in this Section are 
meant to be probabilistic, not deterministic.  For example, raising the possibility of 
diffusion does not imply that it always happens, or that it happens in all periphery 
countries.  It merely means that it happens sometimes, for some countries. 
Fourth, and relatedly, the four boxes of the diagram above describe conceptual 
categories, not mutually exclusive theories.  Various processes falling into all four boxes 
can happen simultaneously even within the same country.  For example, a periphery 
country may be structurally similar to some core country and might therefore adopt 
similar rules in some areas anyway (lower left box), but foreign influence causes 
additional similarity beyond that (upper left box); at the same time, remaining differences 
in the interest group structures cause some prior legal differences to persist (lower right 
box), while misinterpretation of some foreign concept introduces some additional 
unexpected difference (upper right box). 
2.  Plausibility of different scenarios 
This Section discusses the plausibility of the different scenarios described by the two 
dimensions similarity and influence, as represented in the diagram above, in light of the 
evidence of formal diffusion presented in the empirical part above. 
Most social science research considers only domestic determinants of policy-
making such as interest group politics, which leave no room for substantive diffusion 
(although they do leave room for international influences on the economic and 
technological background conditions against which such policy-making operates).
136   
Such purely domestic theories, however, do not provide an explanation for formal 
diffusion.  Something else has to be going on. 
                                                 
136 Cf., e.g. Masahiko Aoki, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001) (considering only 
self-contained models of individual countries).  In most of these models, diffusion of ideas cannot be an 
issue because the actors are assumed to possess perfect knowledge of the action space.  This obviously does 
not necessarily reflect the full world view of the authors of these models, who may make these assumptions 
merely for simplicity to develop a particular aspect of lawmaking. 
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A growing body of research primarily in sociology and political science considers 
the possibility of substantive diffusion in areas such as the form of government
137, family 
policy
138, or trade arrangements
139.
140  The reasons for diffusion considered in the 
literature include coercion, competition, learning, and emulation.
141  For example, world 
polity theorists argue that mere mimicry lead countries around the world to conform to 
the global model of the modern nation state, leading to at least superficial isomorphism 
way beyond what functionalist theories would have predicted.
142 
Even in post-colonial times, foreign pressures presumably drive some diffusion in 
the corporate law sphere.  For example, foreign multinationals may demand a cognizable 
model (competition), and multilateral institutions have pressured developing countries to 
conform to global models of corporate, bankruptcy, and financial law (coercion).
143 
There is good reason to think, however, that substantive diffusion can also happen 
absent outside pressure.  One reason why most social science models of law-making, 
particularly in economics, have no role for foreign templates is that they assume perfect 
foresight / zero information processing costs.  In this case, the general consequences of 
                                                 
137 See, e.g., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, Diffusion and the International Context of 
Democratization, 60 INT’L ORG. 911 (2006). 
138 See Katerina Linos, How International Norms Spread, AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming); id., DIFFUSION OF 
SOCIAL POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 
UMI Dissertation # AAT 3285506). 
139  See,  e.g., Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006). 
140 For more references, see the notes to Parts III.B and IV below.  For a general overview, see Katerina 
Linos, Note, When Do Policy Innovations Spread? Lessons for Advocates of Lesson-Drawing, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1467 (2006). 
141 See Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett, Introduction: The International Diffusion of 
Liberalism, 60 INT’L ORG. 781 (2006). 
142 See John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and the 
Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144 (1997). 
143 The need for a cognizable model is acknowledged in, e.g., the 2002 Report of the Company Legislation 
and Regulatory Framework Committee of Singapore, supra note 62 (noting at para 1.1 that “Singapore’s 
company law should continue to be modeled on one of the two globally recognisable common law 
models”).  For examples of imposition, or attempts thereof, see, e.g., Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. 
Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of 
Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007), 1153-1167, 1172 (describing how Indonesia 
and South Korea were under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to adopt new bankruptcy laws 
during and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997). 
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any possible policy, such as the adoption of a certain type of takeover law, are universally 
understood, and there is nothing to learn from foreign experience.  This assumption is 
made for simplicity and tractability, however, and does not mean that social scientists 
believe these costs do not exist.  After all, social scientists spend their lives trying to 
figure out how society and hence the laws regulating it work, and there is now a very 
active formal literature on learning and peer effects.
144 
If perfect foresight fails and relevant actors do not oversee all the consequences of 
a contemplated legislative act, it is implausible to think that they could perfectly tailor a 
foreign model to their needs in a way that eliminates all fortuitous traces of foreign 
influence.  In fact, the absence of perfect foresight can explain why actors would look to 
foreign models in the first place.  The foreign models contain information about possible 
solutions to policy problems.  Tinkering with the model might introduce unexpected 
difficulties, and designing a domestic statute from scratch would be even riskier.  Pure 
imagination cannot beat experience. 
On reflection, lawyers should not find this at all surprising.  Transactional lawyers 
always start drafting from the template of a prior transaction.  Given all the contingencies 
that need to be considered, starting from a blank page would probably be considered 
professional negligence. To be sure, the template (foreign model) will be adapted to the 
special circumstances of the transaction (recipient country), and drafters aspire to choose 
a suitable model.  Still, there is good reason to think that some of the substance of the 
precedent (foreign model) will find its way into the final product (domestic law) even 
though the drafters would not have put it in had they started from scratch, or if they had 
perfect foresight and could draft a perfect contract (statute).  This is perhaps most 
obvious in a situation where a particular clause does not occur to the drafters because the 
models they work with do not deal with this problem.  In corporate law, one might think 
of certain mechanisms to prevent self-dealing transactions – a subtle regulatory task that 
                                                 
144 For two randomly chosen examples from economics, see Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, Rules of 
Thumb for Social Learning, 101 J. POL. ECON. 612 (1993); Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik & Jeremy C. 
Stein, Thy Neighbor’s Portfolio: Word-of-Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers, 
60 J. FIN. 2801 (2005). 
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has to weigh the disadvantages of deterring beneficial transactions – that are conceivable 
but just do not enter a drafter’s mind because the country where he draws the models 
from does not know that particular mechanism either (but another one does). 
Even when perfect adaptation of the model would in principle be possible, actors 
may not find it in their interest to do so because doing so is costly.  Domestic interest 
groups may accept the deviation of a foreign model from the optimum achievable under 
domestic bargaining if the private cost of bargaining (including lobbying etc) outweigh 
the private cost of the deviation.  In this sense, the choice between a foreign model and an 
autonomously developed alternative resembles the choice between a custom-made good 
and a cheaper but less well adapted good off the shelf.  Alternatively, the foreign model 
could also be focal point in a game with multiple equilibria. 
Since one cannot observe the counterfactual, one cannot prove that recipient 
countries do not perfectly adapt the template to their domestic policy preferences, and 
that they do not choose a model that corresponds perfectly to these preferences to begin 
with.  In other words, one cannot prove that the legislation ultimately adopted differs 
substantively from what the recipient country would have developed autonomously.   
Nevertheless, perfect adaptation (= no substantive diffusion) seems implausible.  First, 
countries take models from countries that are economically and socially rather different.  
For example, Malaysia and Singapore, authoritarian states with concentrated corporate 
ownership, copy their corporate and securities law from Australia and the UK, 
democratic countries with dispersed corporate ownership.
145  Second, the adaptation to 
local circumstances often does not appear to be very thorough.  To take the same 
example, Singapore decided to adapt the new English company law outright before the 
English had even finished drafting it, and they did not even adjust the numbering in 
cross-references of their securities law copied from Australia.
146  As already mentioned 
above, the mastery of the problem required for full adaptation seems to be at odds with 
the decision to use a foreign precedent in the first place, which would be redundant if the 
                                                 
145 See supra text accompanying notes 49 to 52. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52 and 53, respectively. 
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drafters had the ability to foresee all contingencies and craft perfectly adapted 
agreements. 
Besides, some instances of formal diffusion do not even claim to adopt the foreign 
materials to domestic needs.  Doctrinal works citing foreign materials as persuasive 
authority use such materials as authority for the law as it is, or as it should be.  To square 
such behavior with an absence of substantive diffusion, one needs to assert that the 
behavior is irrelevant, or that it serves other purposes than those explicitly stated, such as 
signaling expertise or giving cover to political projects.
147 
The forgotten re-numbering and the “misuse” of foreign authority raises another 
possibility that is in some sense the opposite of the perfect foresight / perfect adaptation 
view.  This is the possibility that copies of foreign models simply do not work, at least 
not as they were meant to.  The comparative law literature is replete with examples of 
“failed transplants” or, as Teubner has called them, “legal irritants.”
148  Of particular 
                                                 
147 Cf. Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 346-350 (1996) (stressing that 
non-legislative law-making requires authority, which can be provided by respected legal materials, possibly 
from a different legal system); Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 41 (2003) (the use of foreign authorities, and the stress on their doctrinal and theoretical rather than 
jurisprudential parts, may have served to protect law’s role “above politics” in a charged political 
atmosphere); López-Medina, supra note 77, at 397 (formal reliance on doctrinal, including foreign, sources 
“was a convenient way of shifting responsibility to unrooted and faceless legal analysis that strengthened 
the idea of objectivity”); Kennedy, supra note 10 (arguing that the globalized form of discourse of the time 
can be used for any political project).  Observers of Latin American law have argued that expertise in US 
law was often used by groups of lawyers outside the ruling political circles as a means to establish their 
rival projects, using US ideas, prestige, and connections to their favor, even though the substantive project 
they advocated could also have been found in the European models.  See in detail Yves Dezalay & Bryant 
G. Garth, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS (2002); and id., supra note 8 (compare, e.g., the 
Argentinian’s mediation movement’s reliance on US sources, although as far as content goes, European 
sources would have served just as well). 
148 See Teubner, supra note 134; and for general problems of “receptiveness” to transplants the references 
cited supra note 22.  To say that a transplant “failed” does not mean that the ultimate outcome is bad.  Part 
I.B.2.b) observed that Latin American corporate law treatises use foreign sources in different ways than 
they are used in their countries of origin.  Similarly, López-Medina, supra note 77 and note 132, shows 
how Latin American lawyers, in particular Colombians, rearrange(d) jurisprudential materials from the core 
in ways that were flatly incompatible with the understanding of these materials in the core.  This use, 
however, is not necessarily deficient.  By way of comparison, Continental European Civilians clearly used 
Roman sources differently than the Romans, but nobody has suggested that this use was deficient as a 
normative-doctrinal discourse (although it was clearly ill-conceived as a historical inquiry).  Cf. generally 
William P. Alford, On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986); 
Esquirol, previous note; id., The Failed Law of Latin America, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2008) (arguing that 
many of the alleged failures of Latin American law are general limitations of law, problems limited to 
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interest from a corporate law point of view, Pistor has argued that the promotion of 
standardized international models especially by multilateral organizations hurts 
developing countries by preventing endogenous legal development adapted to local 
circumstances.
149 
There is no doubt that some transplants “fail” and that domestic forces in the 
recipient countries do influence the course of their legal development  There is even 
reason to think that both of these aspects are very important.  This does not mean, 
however, that foreign influences are fully screened out by domestic politics or totally lost 
by the recipient’s inability to implement them.  In fact, it is hard to believe that domestic 
actors are either smart enough to screen the foreign model perfectly, or stupid enough to 
misunderstand it completely (mis-numbered cross-references also occur in very 
developed jurisdictions).  More likely, they are human and do what they can with the 
materials they find.  In this case, some (substantial?) residue of the foreign influence is 
likely to survive and find its way into the domestic law. 
B.  Role of legal families 
If substantive diffusion occurs, there is good reason to believe that the rules that diffuse 
differ by legal family.  On the one hand, the empirical part above documented that formal 
diffusion mostly follows legal family lines.  In particular, materials and personnel from 
the core civil law countries do not reach the periphery countries of the common law.  On 
the other hand, social scientists have for some time recognized that the developed Anglo-
Saxon countries (= common law core countries) pursue more market-friendly policies 
than the Continental Europeans (= civil law core countries),
150 and the legal origins 
                                                                                                                                                 
particular sectors or countries, or not shortcomings at all when measured against local exigencies, and 
hence that “failed law” is a rhetorical device used to justify legal change). 
149 Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 97 (2002). 
150 See, e.g., the references cited supra note 12. 
45  
literature argues that these differences re-appear in the periphery.
151  The pieces of the 
puzzle fit together.
152 
One possibility why substantive diffusion may follow legal family lines is that 
periphery lawyers trained in some core country, familiar with and perhaps admiring that 
core country’s law, and operating in a legal system that already employs many constructs 
and templates from that core country, will find it easier to seek out and transplant new 
rules from that core country rather than from another of which they may not even know 
the language.  In this connection, it is interesting to note that the only legal materials that 
seem to be able to cross legal family lines are those from common law countries, which 
operate in the modern world’s lingua franca, English; and that none of the civil law 
periphery countries that have preserved French as one of their working languages (i.e., 
those in Africa) shows traces of common law materials. 
At least some sociologists are comfortable with the idea that diffusion is driven by 
the emulation of others that are perceived as fundamentally similar and who are hence 
perceived to be facing the same problems and adopting suitable solutions.
153  Emulation 
is especially likely in areas in which relations between means and ends are not well 
understood and hence alternatives are difficult to evaluate – a description that presumably 
fits large parts of legislative activity, especially in times of drastic changes (such as the 
                                                 
151 See generally the survey by La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences, supra note 2. 
152 Of course, one may not believe the empirical findings of the legal origin literature.  If one does believe 
them, the plausibility of the story just sketched should be judged in comparison to other possible theories 
that purport to explain the legal origins findings. 
153 See in particular David Strang & John W. Meyer, Institutional conditions for diffusion, 22 THEORY & 
SOC’Y 487, 487 and 490-91 (1993).  The notion that the spread of ideas is important for policy diffusion is 
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stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas civil law 
seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations.”).  More precisely, La Porta et al. obviously 
recognize a role for diffusion, but argue that the relevant diffusion occurred during colonial times as the 
European powers spread their legal systems around the world, see id. 287-90. 
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first-time adoption of a securities law).
154  Theorization constitutes entities as being 
similar, i.e., as being part of a group in which diffusion makes sense because the model 
can be expected to have similar effects.
155  If this is correct, the almost universally 
accepted classification of countries into the common and civil law families may have 
been instrumental in channeling diffusion through legal families, and in so doing 
preserving the very differences that gave rise to the classification in the first place.
156  
Elite lawyers involved in the law-making process are acutely aware of the difference 
between common and civil law systems (and have possibly been told over and over again 
that the other system is generally inferior).
157  They are likely to have trained in the core 
country and to believe their country’s legal system to be in some way fundamentally 
similar to, if less developed than, the core country’s.  And they are the ones choosing the 
models.
158 
                                                 
154 Regarding the general hypothesis, cf. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 154 
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extent to which an organisation will model itself after organizations it perceives to be successful.”).  Cf. the 
recognition that “[w]here the question of which rule to adopt is not finally settled in other terms, adherence 
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their activities in places where they have superior expertise.  It is easier to give advise to countries within 
the same legal family that share similar legal concepts, often speak the same or at least a related language, 
and, perhaps partly because of past collaboration, have laws that resemble those of the core country. 
157 See, e.g., the statement by the Singaporean Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee 
that Singaporean law should continued to be modeled on a common law model, supra note 66 and 
accompanying text.  
158 On the importance of experts in the diffusion process, see Strang & Meyer, supra note 153, at 498 
(arguing that the importance of theorization leads to diffusion following relations of theorists rather than 
those linking adopters). 
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From the point of view of rational actor models used in economics and political 
science, it may at first seem puzzling why countries would cling to models of their legal 
family rather than make a conscious decision of a suitable normative model.
159  If one 
believes the legal origin literature, as a result of differences in regulation, labor force 
participation is on average about one to two percent higher in common law countries than 
in French civil law countries, stock market capitalization per GDP is 28 percent higher, 
and so on.
160  It is hard to imagine that the cost of translating a foreign model from an 
alien language and alien legal terminology could be of this magnitude. 
As in many political economy models, however, the explanation for the puzzling 
persistence of the legal family allegiance may lie in the divergence of private and social 
costs and benefits, and resulting collective action problems.  The cost of learning about a 
foreign model is generally private, while the benefit of adopting it is shared (if not by the 
society as a whole, at least among similarly situated individuals).  Moreover, an 
individual lawyer will not be rewarded for learning the law of a rival legal family if 
others stick to the old allegiance.  An aspiring lawyer in a civil (common) law country 
who set out to obtain her legal education in a common (civil) law country might find 
herself unemployable at home, at least at a responsible level, as long as the legal 
profession as a whole continues in the old civil (common) law ways.  Similarly, an 
interest group that spent money on learning about a new model might find it impossible 
                                                 
159 Sociologists explicitly acknowledge that their theories differ from those that would flow from “rational 
decision-making at the individual (adopter) level,” see Strang & Meyer, supra note 153, at 500. 
160 These numbers are calculated from the means of regulatory indices by legal family and regression 
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to overcome resistance to the new model by others who do not understand it and are 
suspicious about the first group’s motives.
161 
Another possibility is that the actors involved do not fully realize the size of the 
stakes involved in choosing a model.  Especially if actors have little credible information 
about models from the other legal family, they may think that the Western models are 
more or less the same, at least in their consequences, an opinion expressed by even 
extremely sophisticated Western lawyers.
162  Alternatively, they may find it too difficult 
to predict the effects of changing to a radically different model, as opposed to making 
incremental changes to a familiar one.  Political economy models do not usually assume 
such severe information imperfections, but then again the standard models also do not 
predict the pervasive formal diffusion documented in the empirical part.  By contrast, 
international organization scholars who study diffusion explicitly acknowledge the role of 
uncertainty and complexity, arguing that they create space for foreign advice processed 
through networks of specialists which are seen as possessing the requisite knowledge
163 – 
in the case of commercial law-making, only lawyers from the same legal family might be 
seen as possessing such knowledge. 
Lastly, the cost of adopting an alien model may be higher than it at first appears.  
Besides the costs of translating and adapting the model, there may be institutional 
complementarities that are hard to overcome except by changing many elements of the 
legal system at once.  For one thing, legal systems may lack certain institutions that make 
a particular arrangement work elsewhere.  The Singaporean Company Legislation and 
                                                 
161 One could imagine a bargaining game in which the outer boundaries of the bargaining space are set by 
the traditional model, i.e., each group has a credible threat to boycott any solution completely outside of 
that model. 
162 See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants, in Nelken & Feest, 
supra note 8, 93, at 96 (“The end results, however, seem either to be the same, or at least functionally 
equivalent.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 
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163 See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination, 46 INT’L 
ORG. 1, 1-3, 12 (1992).  Elite lawyers from one legal family might indeed by considered an “epistemic 
community” as defined by Haas (id. 3) because their training in the universities of the core country imparts 
shared perceptions about the normative goals and positive effects of the law. 
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Regulatory Framework Committee rejected the Delaware model in 2002 because, inter 
alia, “Singapore lacked the enforcement mechanisms (SEC, class actions, contingency 
fees) available in the US.”
164  But there are also more subtle problems of understanding 
and interplay of doctrine.  The grand Italian comparativist Sacco wrote: 
“[A] legal system cannot borrow elements that are expressed in 
terms that are foreign to its own doctrine.  Conversely, if two 
systems have the same codes or both have a system of judge-made 
law, the judges of each country may find it easy to borrow from 
each other.”
165 
In this context, it is worth noting that no country ever fully switched from one 
legal family to another.
166  Some countries, like Japan or to some extent Latin America, 
re-oriented themselves from models of one family to those of another (in both cases, to 
US models).  But even that took over a century in the Latin American case, and only 
came about under US military occupation in Japan.  By analogy, consider the evidence 
from the trade literature cited above which documents a concentration of trade flows 
between former colonies and their former colonizer, and between countries of the same 
legal origin.
167  It is not obvious why the costs of translating shipping documents or 
drafting a contract under the law of another legal family would be sufficient to divert 
trade flows to this extent.  And yet they appear to be. 
One set of theories easily compatible with the rational actor model involves 
outside pressure.  In particular, given that countries tend to trade more with countries of 
the same legal origin, particularly their former colonizer, competition to offer trade 
partners a recognizable legal model may drive periphery countries to adopt their legal 
                                                 
164  See  Report of the Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (Singapore 2002), 
discussed supra, text accompanying notes 62-66. 
165 Sacco, supra note 8, at 400. 
166 Zweigert, supra  note 32, at 45 wonders whether Japan might be passing from German civil law 
influence to common law influence, and postulates a principle of temporary relativity (“zeitliche 
Relativität”) because systems can change.  But he did not then classify Japan as being part of the German 
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167 See Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein, supra note 100. 
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family’s model.
168  Core countries might also politically pressure periphery countries to 
adopt their own model. 
The preceding paragraphs discussed a variety of theories that might explain why 
substantive diffusion follows legal family lines.  Inversely, one may ask what sort of 
argument would be necessary to deny this, given that formal diffusion does follow legal 
family lines, as documented in the empirical part above.  In terms of the scheme 
developed above, one possibility is to deny substantive similarity.  One might argue that 
in spite of formal similarity, the legislation adopted by the periphery country does not 
substantively resemble the origin country’s beyond some elements common to all core 
countries.  This would require that the periphery country purges all idiosyncratic 
elements of the model.  In light of the difficulties of adopting foreign models discussed 
above, however, periphery countries should find this hard to do.  It is also contradicted by 
the evidence adduced in the legal origins literature. 
The other possibility is to deny substantive influence.  One might argue that the 
normative preferences of periphery countries of one legal family differ from those of 
another, and resemble those of their core country.  Hence they autonomously choose to 
adopt rules similar to their core country, even though they may then use statutory 
language from that core country to facilitate the drafting.  This is the theory currently 
advanced in the legal origins literature.
169  But is it plausible that the normative 
commitments of Malaysia and Singapore, countries with heavy state involvement and 
                                                 
168 Competition has been identified as a driver of diffusion in other fields.  See, e.g., Elkins, Guzman & 
Simmons, supra note 139 (arguing that host country competition for foreign direct investment drives the 
diffusion of bilateral investment treaties – once a competitor signs one, other countries follow suit); Duane 
Swank, Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism, 60 INT’L 
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common law models” (emphasis added), supra note 66 and accompanying text (Singapore is, of course, a 
common law country). 
169 See La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences, supra note 2. 
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concentrated corporate ownership, resemble those of England?  And that they resemble 
those of England more than those of France with its more interventionist policies and 
more concentrated corporate ownership?
170  Similarly, why was co-determination – 
mandatory employee representation on companies’ boards – adopted in countries anxious 
to shake off communism like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia, but 
not in India with its long-time socialist aspirations?
171  Such choices are hard to explain 
with general normative commitments of these countries, or economic background 
conditions under which they operate.  By contrast, diffusion provides an easy if 
disturbing answer:  Germany has co-determination and England has not; and the legal 
family classification constitutes Germany as the relevant reference country for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia, while it designates England as the reference 
for India.
172 
IV.  FORMAL EVIDENCE? 
The paper has argued empirically and theoretically that substantive diffusion along legal 
family lines is a plausible explanation of the legal origins evidence, and more plausible 
than other, structural theories that have been put forward in the literature.  Is it possible to 
supply more rigorous evidence for substantive diffusion?  It turns out that this is much 
more difficult than it may at first appear, due to a difficulty of distinguishing diffusion 
and structural theories known as Galton’s Problem, which will be discussed in Section 3 
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geographic factors define “proximity” for diffusion processes, see,  e.g., Nathaniel Beck, Kristian S. 
Gleditsch & Kyle Beardsley, Space is more than geography: Using spatial econometrics in the study of 
political economy, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 27 (2006). 
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below.  One can at least verify, however, that some further predictions of the diffusion 
theory, particularly regarding timing, are borne out by the data, and Section 2 below does 
just that.  First, however, Section A will comment on the available data, which imposes 
some severe constraints on the tests that can be done for the time being. 
A.  Data problems 
If good data were available, there would be no excuse not to run quantitative tests on, 
e.g., time-clustering as discussed below, even if their informative value would be limited 
due to Galton’s Problem.  Unfortunately, the data currently available will not permit 
most of those tests, particularly those involving a time dimension and hence requiring 
panel data. 
To be helpful, the data need to provide reliable, comparable estimates at least of 
law-on-the-books, rather than just fragments of formal law.  The empirical part above 
already provided conclusive evidence for formal diffusion within legal families, as in the 
spread of the English oppression remedy to the common law world.
173  To do so, it was 
enough to point out identical sentences that are found in one set of countries but not in 
the other.  To show differential substantive diffusion, however, one would at least have to 
show that the other countries do not have a similar if differently phrased rule on the 
books. 
The data must also be fine-grained enough to identify differences between legal 
families.  For example, it may not be enough to have only a dummy for the existence of 
insider trading laws if the relevant difference between core countries is the design of such 
laws, rather than their presence. 
For many tests, the data must also vary over time.  Given the difficulty of 
collecting fine-grained legal data even for a simple cross-section, however, there are 
                                                 
173 See supra note 56.  Cross-sectionally, Djankov et al., supra note 160 indeed find that shareholder rights 
to challenge decisions that are “unfair, prejudicial, oppressive, or abusive” are much more commonly found 
in common law jurisdictions (89% vs. 40%).  The question is, however, whether the 40% really count all 
other jurisdictions that have equivalent rules couched in different terms, see Holger Spamann, On the 
Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of the ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ under Consistent Coding, HARVARD 
JOHN M. OLIN FELLOWS’ DISCUSSION PAPER No. 7 (March 2006) = ECGI LAW WORKING PAPER No. 
67/2006 (May), at 38-42. 
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hardly any such data available.  The World Bank’s Doing Business data on corporate law 
only span four years.
174  Data on creditor protection in 129 countries are available for 
1978-2003, but there are very few changes in these data.
175 
Since diffusion and structural theories have broadly identical predictions, 
distinguishing between them will necessarily hinge on relatively subtle features of the 
data.  This places great demands on the reliability of the data.  For example, available 
data on the year of adoption of insider trading legislation in 103 countries suggests that 
Malaysia and Singapore adopted insider trading legislation in 1973, much earlier than the 
UK (1980) or Australia (1991).
176  If correct, this fact might contradict the diffusion 
theory proposed in this paper.  The fact is untrue, however.  Both Malaysia and Singapore 
imported their insider trading regulation much later from Australia.  The rule adopted by 
Malaysia and Singapore in 1973 was a copy of a precursor provision from Australian law 
that, whether it counts as an insider trading provision or not, was certainly adopted first in 
Australia.
177 
For these reasons, the cross-sectional data from the legal origins literature seem to 
be the best legal data one can get for the time being.
178  As to other relevant data, they are 
often quite limited as well.  For example, Part II.B above mentioned that the available 
student migration data do not separate out law students from other majors.  Data on 
languages spoken do not separate out second languages of elites, or the language of the 
courts.  And so on.  These data could all be gathered, but for the time being they are not 
available. 
                                                 
174 See www.doingbusiness.org (visited April 2009). 
175 See Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Private credit in 129 countries, 84 J. FIN. 
ECON.  299, 319 (2007) (reporting only 32 changes, mostly in transition economies towards the end of the 
sample). 
176 Utpal Bhattarcharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 (2002). 
177 Cf. Woon, supra note 41, at 543 (with n.26) (noting that the predecessor of the current Singparean 
insider trading laws was s. 132A introduced in 1973 and based on s. 124A of the Companies Act of 
Victoria, Australia); Alexander F. Loke, From the Fiduciary Theory to Information Abuse: The Changing 
Fabric of Insider Trading Law in the U.K, Australia, and Singapore, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 126 and 153 
(2006) (Singapore imported its insider trading law from Australia). 
178 Naturally, some of these data are better than others, and in particular, the newer data sets are 
conceptually more convincing.  Cf. supra note 2 for some problems with the earliest data sets. 
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B.  Further Tests of Diffusion Theories’ Predictions 
There are a number of further predictions of diffusion theories, however, that one can at 
least check against known facts, as well as, obviously, against the data that are available. 
This paper has considered various channels of diffusion, such as emulation, 
learning, imposition, or competition, and, correspondingly, various factors that could 
predispose a country to follow one or the other legal family’s model, such as a common 
legal heritage, linguistic ties, or colonial ties more broadly conceived, including 
economic ties and post-colonial spheres of influence. 
At the broadest level, these various diffusion theories are all consistent with the 
legal origins literature’s evidence of cross-sectional differences between common and 
civil law countries, which was obviously the motivation to develop these theories in this 
paper in the first place.  There are also some more nuanced predictions, however, that are 
borne out in the data.  First, the countries with the loosest ties on all aforementioned 
counts now follow primarily US models, the earlier influence of civil law models 
notwithstanding.  These are the East Asian countries which were never colonized, never 
adopted a European language for their legal system, were later occupied or protected by 
the US military, and trade predominantly with the US.  Similar things can be said about 
the Philippines, which were, however, initially colonized by Spain.  These countries also 
tend to do very well on the legal and outcome measures of the legal origins literature.  
Second, countries that have lost touch with the developments in their legal family under 
socialism now use a larger variety of models.  They tend not to do well on the measures 
of the legal origins literature, but this can be explained by the special problems of 
transition economies. 
The most basic timing prediction of the diffusion theories – core countries adopt 
first, periphery countries follow – is borne out by semi-systematic and casual evidence 
about patterns of legal change in core and periphery countries, which shows core 
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countries to be the leaders (and, often, show that periphery countries explicitly follow the 
core models).
179 
In much of the diffusion research surveyed above, diffusion is marked by 
temporal proximity between adoption in the leader and the follower country.  Such 
proximity makes it easier to distinguish diffusion from other phenomena (see Section 3 
below), but it is not a necessary consequence of diffusion.
180  Diffusion merely implies 
that the adoption of a certain technology, regulation, etc. is more likely given that it has 
already been adopted elsewhere.  More precisely, many of the arguments in favor of 
diffusion reviewed above stated that if and when a periphery country decides to adopt a 
certain type of law (for example, insider trading legislation), it will turn to the model of 
its core country for guidance.  Hence the argument of this paper is not undermined by 
studies showing that periphery countries often lag considerably behind core countries, 
and enact far fewer changes to their law than core countries.
181 
Allowing a considerable lag between adoption in the leader country and adoption 
in the follower country is to recognize that other, complimentary forces affect the timing 
of adoption in the follower country.  Such modesty, however, is a feature shared by all 
theories attempting to explain differences between legal families, which are obviously 
just a fraction of the variance between countries around the world.
182  For example, the 
                                                 
179 See Pistor et al., supra note 22 (tracking legal change in 10 jurisdictions); and all of the evidence cited in 
Part I.B above. 
180  Cf. Alberto Paloni, Diffusion in Sociological Analysis, in Committee on Population, DIFFUSION 
PROCESSES AND FERTILITY TRANSITION: SELECTED PERSPECTIVES (John B. Casterline ed.) 66, 76 (2001), 
who notes that “[t]he observed rate of change in the prevalence of behavior by itself will generally be of 
limited help to identify a diffusion process because the effects of the basic elements of a diffusion process 
may lead to outcomes that can also be produced by mechanisms not associated with diffusion at all.”).   
181 See Pistor et al., supra note 22 (tracking legal change in 10 jurisdictions). 
182 Cf. the concluding sentence of the first article of the literature, which generally argues that legal rules in 
common law countries are superior, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 2, 1152: 
“France and Belgium, after all, are both very rich countries.”  Later debates regarding the relationship of 
legal origins to other factors did not question the relevance of the other factors, and focused instead on the 
question whether they explain all of the effect attributed to legal origins by parts of the literature, cf. La 
Porta et al., The Economic Consequences, supra note 2, 287: “Our strong conclusion is that, while all these 
factors influence laws, regulations, and economic outcomes, it is almost certainly false that legal origin is 
merely a proxy for any of them.”  Nevertheless, some observers have ironically called legal origins the “Da 
Vinci code of legal development,” Association Henri Capitant, LES DROIT CIVILISTES EN QUESTION 33 
(para. 25) (2006). 
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almost universal adoption of insider trading laws in the first half of the 1990s in both 
common and civil law countries cannot be explained by any theory focused on 
differences between common and civil law countries.
183  What might be explained by 
such theories, however, is why the details of the laws adopted differ between common 
and civil law countries.
184 
C.  Distinguishing Diffusion from Structural Theories 
The interaction of theories of legal family differences with other forces affecting legal 
change complicates what is already a difficult task, testing diffusion and structural 
theories against one another.
185  The basic problem is known in the literature as Galton’s 
Problem.
186  It derives from the observation, already stated numerous times in this paper 
and further explained below, that diffusion and structural theories can have broadly the 
                                                 
183 On this wave of adoptions, see  Bhattarcharya & Daouk, supra  note 176, 88-90 (subject to the 
qualifications expressed in the main  text accompanying notes 176-177).  The wave may have been 
prompted by some country or multilateral organization pushing for the adoption of such laws (a 
phenomenon that in the terminology of this paper would be called diffusion), or by technological 
developments, particularly the advance of computer technology, that shifted the cost-benefit calculus of 
monitoring and persecuting insider trading.  By contrast, structural theories based on political economy or 
financial market development should have a hard time explaining why countries like Ecuador, Egypt, 
Ghana, Jamaica, and Zambia  on the one hand, and Australia and Germany on the other all adopted an 
insider trading laws around the same time. 
184 Some systematic differences are documented by Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Law 
Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 159 (2004). 
185 On the problems involved, see generally Robert J. Franzese & Jude C. Hays, Interdependence in 
Comparative Politics, 41 COMP.  POL.  STUD. 742, 751 et seq. (2008) [hereinafter Franzese & Hays, 
Interdependence]; id., Empirical Models of Spatial Interdependence, in Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. 
Brady & David Collier (eds.), OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL METHODOLOGY 570 (2008); Charles F. 
Manski, Economic Analysis of Social Interactions, 14(3) J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 128-30 (2000); Paloni, supra 
note 180. 
186 Galton made his point in 1899 at a meeting of the Royal Anthropological Institute, commenting on a 
presentation of Edward Tylor: 
“Tylor had compiled information on institutions of marriage and descent for 350 cultures and 
examined the correlations between these institutions and measures of societal complexity. Tylor 
interpreted his results as indications of a general evolutionary sequence, in which institutions 
change focus from the maternal line to the paternal line as societies become increasingly 
complex. Galton disagreed, pointing out that similarity between cultures could be due to 
borrowing, could be due to common descent, or could be due to evolutionary development; he 
maintained that without controlling for borrowing and common descent one cannot make valid 
inferences regarding evolutionary development.” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galton’s_problem, visited 04/15/2009. 
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same predictions.
187  Empirically disentangling these theories hence requires attention to 
fine differences in their predictions.
188  In the current context, however, the available data 
hardly allow this; in addition, the theories in question may not be well enough developed 
to deliver sufficiently differentiated predictions. 
To recapitulate, structural theories as understood in this paper postulate that there 
are internal, structural differences between civil and common law countries, such as 
different court systems or different attitudes to regulation of markets, which lead them to 
adopt different policy solutions.
189  As reported in the introduction, the leading authors of 
the legal origins literature envision that certain technological limitations or cultural 
predispositions lead common law countries to support private market outcomes, while 
they lead civil law countries to favor state-desired allocations.  The precise nature of 
these limitations or predispositions is not specified.
190  Formal diffusion of law could be 
rationalized by these theories as a drafting aid. 
How could these broad structural theories distinguish themselves from the 
diffusion theories discussed in this paper?  Cross-sectionally, these structural theories 
obviously predict the same differences between common and civil law families in the 
periphery as the diffusion theories proposed in this paper – both theories were designed 
with that purpose in mind (and the structural theories also purport to explain differences 
within the core).  Both sets of theories would or could also predict the observed 
                                                 
187 The diffusion theories discussed in this paper would be easier to test than other examples in the literature 
because the posited diffusion is uni-directional, i.e., only from a handful of core countries to the periphery, 
not vice versa, or, for most purposes, between periphery countries (interactions between core countries are 
also interesting but not part of the theories considered here).  This eliminates the “reflection problem” 
(Manski, supra note 185, 128), namely that each unit of observation in turn influences all others, see id. 
128-30; Franzese & Hays, Interdependence, supra note 185, 755. 
188 See See Franzese & Hays, Interdependence, supra note 185, at 13 and 19-20; Manski, supra note 185. 
189 See in particular La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences, supra note 2 (arguing that common and 
civil law systems differ in their strategy of social control); Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 16 (arguing that 
common law countries possess more independent judiciaries); Thorsten Beck, Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross 
Levine, Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003) (arguing that 
common law systems are more adaptable); Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, Lawyers and politicians: The 
impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms, 17 CONST. POL. ECON. 43 (2006) (arguing 
that stronger, unitary organized legal professions in common law countries have a beneficial influence on 
law-making). 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19. 
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attenuation of the legal family effects on the fringes of the families.  The diffusion 
theories would predict this because, e.g., language or trade ties bind less on the fringes.  
Structural theories could plausibly assert that the core’s technological or cultural imprint 
from colonial times is less deep on the fringes, for similar historical reasons. 
 Unlike structural theories, diffusion theories are inherently dynamic.  This does 
not mean, however, that the mere introduction of a time dimension (legal change) is 
enough to identify diffusion and refute the structural theories.  The world does not stand 
still.  As conditions change, so do the policy responses predicted by structural theories, 
including by the structural theories of legal family differences.
191  One possibility is that 
conditions change purely due to internal developments, such as internal population 
dynamics.
192  In that case, structural theories would predict that policy changes in 
different countries are independent of one another, a prediction that is falsifiable by 
identifying waves of adoption in the data.  The other, more difficult possibility, however, 
is that conditions change for several countries at once, for example due to changes in 
world commodity prices or technological discoveries (“common shocks”).  In that case, 
waves of adoption can also be driven by independent reactions to common shocks, rather 
than diffusion.
193  Distinguishing between independent reactions to common shocks and 
interdependent diffusion processes is the key problem of modern diffusion research.
194 
In particular, diffusion within legal families might be difficult to distinguish from 
shocks that are common to countries of the same legal family, for example because of the 
                                                 
191  See in particular Aron Balas, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Divergence of Legal Procedures, AM. ECON. J. POL’Y (forthcoming), manuscript 15-17 (arguing that civil 
law countries reacted to an increase in litigation after the second world war by formalizing and centralizing 
civil procedure, while common law countries did the opposite). 
192 One might object that even seemingly internal developments, like population dynamics, are directly or 
indirectly influenced by external factors, such as cultural role models or migration possibilities.  For 
purposes of this paragraph, this would only mean that the problem discussed here is basically inevitable. 
193 In the technology example, it would probably be the case that the technology diffuses (e.g., computers), 
but one would still wonder whether the particular policy (which might be only indirectly connected with 
computers, such as the example of insider trading surveillance mentioned above) is an autonomous 
response to the technology diffusion, or itself the result of policy diffusion. 
194 See Franzese & Hays, Interdependence, supra note 185, at 11 and 13-17; id., web appendix available at 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/FranzeseHays.CPS.InterdependenceCP.WebAppendix.pdf, 2; 
Gleditsch & Ward, supra note 137, at 923. 
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close(r) economic ties between countries of the same family.  In general, diffusion in 
corporate and securities law may be hard to distinguish from common shocks because the 
integration of world financial markets will transmit many relevant shocks to all or many 
of the world’s financial markets.
195  Some “shocks,” such as new technological 
developments, are likely to affect only the core countries at first, so that structural 
theories would predict the core countries to lead in issues of regulatory change, just like 
the diffusion theories predict they do.  To make progress, one would at least have to 
identify candidate shocks that might policy changes under the structural theories. 
The problem of distinguishing diffusion and structural theories of legal families at 
a general level becomes wholly unsolvable, however, if policy changes are triggered by 
some third, complimentary force, and the legal family differences merely influence the 
form of the policy change.  For example, as mentioned in the previous Section, both 
common and civil law countries participated in the wave of new insider trading laws of 
the early 1990s.  Hence the timing of this wave reveals nothing about legal family 
differences.  What may differ between legal families is the content of the adopted laws, 
but differential content could be explained both by structural differences, or by the use of 
different models (assuming the adopted laws correspond to the models in the predicted 
way). 
Thus it appears that the most promising way forward will be to distinguish 
diffusion and structural theories by the particular channels through which they operate.  
To wit, diffusion theories may emphasize the importance of shared languages, close 
economic ties, or the activity of foreign advisors, while structural theories may emphasize 
the structure of the judiciary, or prevailing cultural norms.  With appropriate data, 
quantitative research can investigate which of these factors better predicts observed 
patterns.  Importantly, these tests can be done with cross-sectional data, which is already 
available at least as far as the legal, left-hand side data is concerned. 
                                                 
195  Cf. Franzese & Hays, Interdependence,  supra note 185, at 744 (noting that globalization implies 
interdependence). 
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In fact, many of these tests have already been run, and some of them have been 
discussed in this paper.  The upshot is that these tests have not yet identified any 
structural factors that could explain the legal family differences in the periphery.
196  If the 
literature has not abandoned the idea that structural theories might be driving the legal 
family differences in the periphery, it is because some such factor might yet be identified.  
This possibility can obviously not be ruled out in the abstract, and there have been some 
interesting recent proposals relating to the structure of the judiciary and the legal 
profession that remain to be brought to the (as yet unavailable) data.
197 
Given the state of the evidence presented in this paper, diffusion must at least be 
treated as a plausible alternative to structural theories.  In particular, it is improper to take 
cross-sectional estimates of differences between legislation in common and civil law 
countries as evidence of structural differences between common and civil law.  Tests that 
do so have to assume that individual observations are statistically independent.  But as 
Galton pointed out in 1899, the possibility of diffusion implies that this is improper.  
Developing suitable tests of the two sets of theories provides ample opportunity for future 
research. 
V.  CONCLUSION  –  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF LEGAL  FAMILIES IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW 
Using corporate and securities law as an example, this paper has documented the 
pervasive circulation of formal legal materials (statutes, precedents, and doctrinal 
sources) from the core developed countries to periphery and semi-periphery countries 
even after de-colonization, and some channels through which these materials might 
spread (legal cooperation and development aid, trade ties, and student migration).  The 
                                                 
196 See, e.g., La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences, supra note 2 (arguing that cultural and political 
theories cannot explain the evidence); Roe, supra  note 3 (arguing that case law cannot explain the 
evidence); Roe, supra note 16 (arguing that the existence of juries cannot explain the evidence). 
197 See Grajzl & Murrell, supra note 189; Gillian K. Hadfield, The levers of legal design: Institutional 
determinants of the quality of law, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 43 (2008) (stressing the role of selection and career 
paths of judges, among other things). 
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paper emphasized that this “formal diffusion” is contained largely within legal family 
boundaries. 
The paper then interpreted this evidence in light of theories from comparative 
law, sociology, political science, and economics.  It argued that it is plausible that the 
legal families channel not only formal but substantive diffusion, i.e., that periphery 
countries continue to be influenced disproportionately by substantive legal models of the 
core countries of their legal family.  To be sure, with rapid improvements in 
communication technologies and ever increasing economic integration, this observation 
from the second half of the 20
th century may yield to more standardized global models in 
the 21
st century. 
Finally, the paper identified the demanding conditions for rigorously empirically 
distinguishing such substantive diffusion from other, structural theories that purport to 
explain differences between common and civil law countries around the world.  Both sets 
of theories predict different regulatory regimes in civil and common law countries, and 
both are compatible with dynamic patterns observed or likely to be observed in the data.  
Until rigorous tests are available, both theories need at least to be taken into 
consideration.  In particular, cross-sectional evidence of differences between common 
and civil law countries cannot be interpreted as evidence for structural differences 
between common and civil law as long as diffusion is not ruled out. 
Many aspects of legal diffusion remained outside the paper’s scope.  In particular, 
the paper did not address diffusion between core countries.  Nor did it address the 
intriguing possibilities that the models of the core countries may differ in their suitability 
for less developed countries (particularly Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire vs. Continental-
European welfare state models), or that the periphery countries of different legal families 
may differ in their ability to absorb legal transplants successfully.
198  For instance, it was 
                                                 
198 On the idea that some core models may be more inappropriate for developing countries than others see 
Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595, 609-612 (2003) (arguing that heavy regulation that 
may work in countries with a well-developed bureaucracy fails when transplanted to less developed 
countries).  On the importance of “receptiveness” to transplants generally, see Berkowitz et al., supra note 
22. 
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shown that common law periphery countries continue to work with current case law from 
England and other developed common law countries, while Latin American civil law 
countries do not do so at all.  This might be a symptom or a cause of successful and 
unsuccessful transplantation, respectively.
199 
The paper’s evidence of legal families’ role for (at least formal) diffusion is an 
important addition to comparative law’s picture of the legal families.  The paper showed 
the continuing relevance of the legal families at least for superficial processes of legal 
change and for the “external relations” of the world’s legal systems. 
                                                 
199 Cf. John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109 (1996) (arguing that attempts 
of the French revolution to make the law “judge-proof” were relatively quickly rejected in France but keep 
a grip on the countries to which French law was transplanted); Sandra F. Joireman, Colonization and the 
Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common law and Civil law Countries, 15 CONST. POL. ECON. 
315 (arguing that a difference between the ability of common and civil law countries to provide the rule of 
law is only observed in former colonies). 
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